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ABSTRACT 
 
The ideal of individual liberty and autonomy requires that society 
provide relief against coercion. In the law, this requirement is often 
translated into rules that operate “post-coercion” to undo the legal 
consequences of acts and promises extracted under duress. This 
Article argues that these ex-post anti-duress measures, rather than 
helping the coerced party, might in fact hurt her. When coercion is 
credible—when a credible threat to inflict an even worse outcome 
underlies the surrender of the coerced party—ex post relief will only 
induce the strong party to execute the threatened outcome, to the 
detriment of the coerced party. Anti-duress relief can be helpful to the 
coerced party only when the threat that led to her surrender was not 
credible, or when the making of threats can be deterred in the first 
place. The credibility methodology developed in this Article, 
descriptive in nature, is shown to be a prerequisite (or an important 
complement) to any normative theory of coercion. The Article 
explores the implications of credible coercion analysis for existing 
philosophical conceptions of coercion, and applies its lessons in 
different legal contexts, ranging from contractual duress and 
unconscionability to plea bargains and bankruptcy. 
                                                 
*  Bar-Gill is a Junior Fellow, Harvard Society of Fellows; Ben-Shahar is a Professor 
of Law and Economics, University of Michigan. Helpful comments were provided 
by Douglas Baird, Laura Fitzgerald, Don Herzog and workshop participants at 
Michigan. Michael Daniel and Efrat Procaccia provided excellent research 
assistance. Financial support from the John M. Olin Centers for Law and Economics 
at Harvard Law School and at the University of Michigan Law School and from the 
William F. Milton Fund of Harvard University is gratefully acknowledged. 
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 CREDIBLE COERCION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The ideal of individual liberty and autonomy requires that 
society provide relief against coercion. This Article argues that the 
legal measures against wrongful coercion are more limited than 
previously thought. It provides a skeptical view: when individuals are 
coerced into taking actions or making promises, some of the 
traditional anti-duress measures may not do much to redress their 
misfortune. In fact, it might often be better for these coerced 
individuals if such anti-duress measures would not be applied at all. 
Coercion occurs when an individual is placed under a threat: 
“commit a requested act (or refrain from an act), or else an 
undesirable outcome would be inflicted upon you.” When the 
individual has no alternative way to avert the undesirable outcome but 
to “surrender” and commit the requested act, it is tempting to 
diminish her responsibility for the consequences of the act. Thus, for 
example, when the requested act is a contractual promise—when an 
individual is coerced to accept contractual terms favorable to the 
threatening party—there is a long tradition in the law of contracts that 
relieves the coerced party from contractual liability. 1  
Under the skeptical view developed in this Article, nullifying 
such coercive promises, or any other coerced- into acts, might not 
always be in the interest of the coerced party. Instead, her well-being 
might be better served if the law were to deem her act voluntary and 
give it ordinary efficacy. This claim is based on the concept of 
credible coercion, which is developed in this Article.  
To understand the logic underlying this counter intuitive 
claim, consider the perspective of the threatening party. This party is 
threatening to do something undesirable to the threatened party, 
should his demands be turned down. This act of coercion is 
considered credible if, were his demands to be turned down, it would 
be in the interest of the threatening party to bring about the threatened 
outcome. That is, if to prevent the threatening party from carrying out 
his threat the other party must surrender and commit the act or make 
the requested promise, the threat is credible. A credible threat is the 
opposite of a bluff. 
When coercion is credible, the threatened party is 
unfortunately limited to only two choices: (1) surrender to the threat, 
or (2) refuse to surrender and suffer the threatened adverse outcome. 
The fact that the threat is credible establishes that a third possibility, 
one where the threat is turned down and the threatening party then 
refrains from carrying it out, is unattainable. It is unattainable 
because, if the threat were to be turned down, it would be in the 
interest of the threatening party to carry out the threat, rather than 
“retreat.”  
                                                 
1 See, e.g., 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §28.6 at p. 57 (Rev. ed. 2002) (“A 
modification coerced by a wrongful threat to breach under circumstances in which 
the coerced party has no reasonable alternative should prima facie be voidable.”) 
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 CREDIBLE COERCION 2 
Still, it might be thought that this third option can be salvaged 
by a legal regime that nullifies ex post the implications of a coerced 
act or promise. For example, it might be suggested that if a party were 
coerced into an undesired contract, he would be best served by the 
following strategy: surrender and remove the threat now and later 
petition the court to invalidate the contract. This option would of 
course be most favorable to the threatened part, as she would suffer 
neither the threatened outcome nor the consequences of the coerced 
promise.  
Unfortunately, however, when coercion is credible, this option 
does not exist. If the threatened party were able to invalidate the 
coerced act, the threatening party would surely anticipate this ex-post 
retraction. Ex-ante, the threatening party would recognize that it is 
impossible for him to extract an enforceable surrender. Realizing that 
anti-duress rules would later invalidate the threatened-party’s 
surrender, he would not bother to make the threat. He would simply 
do that which he would otherwise threaten to do. The anti-duress rules 
thus strip away the threatened party’s choice between surrendering to 
the threat and facing the threatened outcome—a choice that the 
threatening party would otherwise be ready to give. Rather than a 
choice between two evils, the threatened party is left only with the 
greater of the two evils. 
The concept of credible coercion runs against deeply rooted 
intuitions concerning the power of the law to alleviate the effects of 
duress. In a variety of contexts, most commonly in contractual 
settings, legal policy is founded on the premise that ex-post anti-
duress measures such as invalidation of coerced promises and acts can 
help the threatened party. 2 The thesis developed in this Article 
provides reason to be skeptical of such anti-duress rules. It suggests 
that whenever the act or promise was induced by credible coercion, 
anti-duress measures will only hurt the threatened party.  
The concept of credible coercion developed in this Article can 
be applied to shed light on a host of legal and moral issues related to 
coerced acts and promises. For example, there is an ongoing 
philosophical exploration of the boundary between coercion and 
“hard bargaining.” Recognizing that, on the one hand, coercion can 
occur even without pointing a gun to the head, and, on the other hand, 
not every “take-it-or-leave-it” proposal is coercive, various criteria 
have been offered to distinguish between non-coercive proposals 
which are referred to as “offers,” and coercive proposals which are 
referred to as “threats.”3  
                                                 
2 See, generally, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 ("If a party's 
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that 
leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim"). 
Specific examples are discussed in Part III, infra .  
3 See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 458 
(Sidney Morgenbesser et al., eds., 1969); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 
95 et seq. (1981); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204 et seq. (1987). 
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 CREDIBLE COERCION 3 
The analysis in this Article contributes to this exploration by 
demonstrating that, at least for the purpose of determining the 
enforceability of the resulting concession, whether a proposal is 
classified as an enforceable offer or rather as a non-enforceable threat 
should depend on its credibility. If it is in the interest of the proposing 
party to carry out the adverse consequence, as he claims he will, in the 
event that the other party does not give- in, his proposal is credible and 
should be considered an “offer,” not a “threat,” even if it is offensive 
under some normative criteria. 
Credible coercion analysis, while arguing that common anti-
duress measures are often too “naïve” to help coerced parties, does 
not end with this skeptical nothing-can-be-done claim. Rather, it 
provides a new starting point—a different methodology—for anti-
duress policy. Recognizing that the credibility of the threat is key, the 
analysis suggests that legal measures should be evaluated by their 
ability to affect the credibility of the threat. It demonstrates that a 
policy can promote the interests of the threatened party if it changes 
the incentives of the threatening party, inducing him to refrain from 
carrying out the threat, or from making it in the first place. Pursing 
this ‘credibility methodology,” we show that whenever credibility is 
acquired through deliberate investment that has the sole purpose of 
generating credible threats, anti-duress measures that strip away the 
gains from coercion can discourage such wasteful investment, and 
thus prevent the credible threat from ever being made. 
The Article is structured as follows: Section I develops the 
concept of credible coercion. It explains what credible threats are, and 
what types of social policies would or would not be effective in 
dealing with such threats. Section II then compares the concept of 
credible coercion to some of the prominent normative concepts of 
coercion appearing in the literature. Section III explores the 
implications of credible coercion in different legal contexts, ranging 
from contractual duress and unconscionability to plea bargains and 
bankruptcy. Section IV Concludes. 
 
I. THE CONCEPT OF CREDIBLE COERCION 
 
A. Credible Threats 
 
The genesis of any isolated act of coercion is usually a threat. 
The coerced party succumbs to a particular painful course of action—
promise, act, omission—because it will help her avoid an even more 
adverse consequence which is threatened to be brought about. 
Deeming no other way to avert the threatened consequence, the 
coerced party surrenders and chooses that which the threatening party 
demanded.4 
                                                 
4  The term “threat” is used here in a looser sense than the one employed in much of 
the coercion literature. In this Article, a “threat” is a factual characterization of a 
statement that has the structure “commit a requested act or else some (adverse) 
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The fear that the threat would be carried out induces the 
threatened party into a course of action that she would otherwise 
prefer to avoid. Focusing on the perspective of the threatened party, 
most accounts of coercion look at the voluntariness of the action. 
According to the prevalent inquiry, it is important to know what other 
alternatives were available to the surrendering party, why did she find 
herself unable to withstand the threat, and whether she readily 
committed the requested act or had done so under “protest.” The 
freedom of her will is the key. 5 
 While most philosophical and legal characterizations of 
coercion follow this line of inquiry and focus on the situation of the 
threatened party, this Article proposes a different methodology. In 
determining whether relief should be granted to the coerced party, the 
focus should be on the motivation of the threatening party. The single 
decisive factor in determining whether remedies should be granted is 
whether the threat was credible: was the threatening party ready and 
willing to carry out the threat in the event that the threatened party did 
not acquiesce, or was he merely bluffing? 
 A credible threat is one that the threatening party intends to 
carry out. Credibility is evaluated at the junction where the threat fails 
to induce the threatened party to surrender and thus fails to induce the 
demanded course of action. If that situation arrives—if the threatening 
party can no longer coerce the other party to surrender to his will—
what would the threatening party prefer to do? If at that moment he 
perceives his payoff from carrying out the threatened outcome to 
exceed his payoff from not doing so, his threat is credible. Otherwise, 
if it is in the interest of the threatening party not to carry out the 
threatened outcome, his threat is not credible. 
 
                                                                                                                  
outcome would be imposed.” In the literature, by contrast, such statements are 
usually labeled “proposals,” and the term “threats” is a normative characterization 
of a sub-set of “proposals” that are concluded to be coercive. “Proposals” that are 
concluded to be non-coercive are usually labeled “offers.” Put differently, in this 
Article “threats” are the starting point—the things that need to be analyzed to 
determine whether they are coercive; whereas in the literature “threats” are often the 
conclusion of the analysis. See, e.g., Nozick, supra note 3, at 458 (“I have claimed 
that normally a person is not coerced into performing an action if he performs it 
because someone has offered him something to do it, though normally he is coerced 
into performing an action if he does so because of a threat that has been made 
against his not doing so.”);  FRIED, supra note 3, at 98-99 (“a promise procured by a 
threat to do wrong to the promisor, a threat to violate his rights, is without moral 
force. It is such threats that constitute the legal category of duress.”); WERTHEIMER, 
supra note 3, at 204 (“When are proposals coercive? The intuitive answer is that 
threats are coercive whereas offers are not….”). 
5  The centrality of this freedom-of-will test in determining the existence of coercion 
is a recognized feature of the doctrine of duress in contract law. See, e.g., 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §175 (1) (“If a party’s manifestation of assent is 
induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no 
reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”); Robert A. Hillman, 
Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of 
Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 880-84 (“the issue of free assent is at the 
core.”) 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interactive decision tree in Figure I depicts the choices of 
the threatening party, A, and the threatened party B. Initially, at time 
1, A has to decide whether to carry out an act X which is adverse to 
B, not carry it out, or threaten that unless B performs Y, the adverse 
outcome X would be carried out. If A makes the threat, then at time 2 
B has to decide whether or not to surrender. Lastly, at time 3, if B did 
not surrender, A has to decide whether to make good on his threat and 
carry out X or “withdraw.” For any combination of strategies for both 
parties, the payoffs are denoted by a pair in which the first element 
represents A’s payoff and the second B’s payoff (subscripted “A” and 
“B” respectively). Specifically, if A carries out X, the payoffs to A 
and B are xA, xB, respectively. If, instead, B surrenders, and performs 
Y, the payoffs to A and B are yA, yB. Lastly, if B does not surrender 
and A does not carry out X, there is no change in the parties’ well-
being relative to their pre- interaction positions, and thus the payoffs 
are normalized to 0, 0.  
 To illustrate, consider the following example.  
 
Example 1: Contract Modification. “A, who has contracted 
to sell goods to B, makes an improper threat to refuse to 
deliver the goods to B unless B modifies the contract to 
increase the price. B attempts to buy substitute goods 
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 CREDIBLE COERCION 6 
elsewhere but is unable to do so. Being in urgent need of 
the goods, he makes the modification.”6  
 
In this example, X is breach; Y is a modification of the 
contract. xA measures how much better-off A is under breach relative 
to performance of the original terms (which depends on, among other 
things, his expected liability). xB measure how gravely will B be hurt 
by breach, given that she may nevertheless be able to collect damages. 
yA and yB measure the change in A and B’s payoff under the modified 
terms, relative to the original price. 
The typical threat scenario involves two characteristics. It 
must be that yA > xA namely, that A gets a higher payoff by inducing 
B to commit the requested act Y than by inflicting X unilaterally.  
Also it must be that yB > xB namely, that the threatened party B is 
better off surrendering to the threat, than seeing it carried out.  That is 
yA > xA is a pre-condition for the threat to be made; and yB > xB is a 
pre-condition for coercion to succeed.  In the contract modification 
example, yA > xA is equivalent to saying that the supplier will be 
better off under the modified price relative to unilateral breach; and yB 
> xB is equivalent to saying that the buyer is better off paying the 
higher price than suffering breach and collecting remedies. 
We say that A’s threat is credible if xA > 0, namely, if A’s 
payoff from carrying out his threat exceeds his payoff from not 
carrying it out. In the example, whether xA > 0 depends on how much 
A saves in performance costs by breaching, how much B already paid, 
how likely is A to pay damages, etc’. When A’s threat is credible, we 
can make two predictions. First, a “time 3” prediction: if A made a 
threat and B rejected it, then, at time 3 A would proceed to carry out 
the threatened act. If the buyer rejects the supplier’s modification 
demand, the supplier will breach. Second, a “time 1” prediction: if, 
when B surrenders, she can later revoke her surrender (e.g., have a 
court invalidate the coerced bargain, or otherwise undo the effects of 
the coerced act), then at time 1 A would carry out the adverse 
outcome. A would recognize that any act or commitment he extracts 
by the threat would later be revoked, stripping him of any advantage 
he gained by threatening the other party, and placing him in the same 
position as if the threat were rejected. A would recognize that his 
“ideal” payoff, yA (e.g., a higher price), is not attainable/enforceable. 
Accordingly, when his threat is credible—when xA > 0—the 
threatening party would rather carry out the adverse outcome at time 1 
and get xA, than make a threat that can only induce a revocable 
surrender and a payoff of, at most, 0. 
 
Example 2: The Usury Case.7 In a time of war and 
instability, A, a rich individual, offers to loan money to B, a 
                                                 
6 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 cmt. b, ill. 5, describing a common 
scenario dealt with by the doctrines of duress and modification.   
9
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 CREDIBLE COERCION 7 
poor individual, who cannot secure funds elsewhere. For 
the immediate loan of $25, B promises to pay $2,000 at a 
later period, after the war would end.  
 
We say that A’s implicit threat not to loan the $25 for 
anything less than a promise to pay back $2,000 is credible if, for a 
promise to pay back anything less, A would prefer not to make the 
loan altogether. Similarly, A’s threat is credible if, under a legal 
regime that would scrutinize this deal ex-post and reduce B’s 
obligation to pay to a sum smaller than $2,000, A would prefer not to 
make the loan. Conversely, A’s threat is not credible if he would 
prefer to make the loan even for some lower rate of return. 
 What factors make a threat credible? A threat is credible, —
but for surrender it would be carried out —if the payoff to the 
threatening party from carrying out the threatened outcome exceeds 
his payoff from not doing so. Therefore, factors that increase the 
relative payoff from executing the threat (as compared to non-
execution) enhance the credibility of the threat. Conversely, and more 
importantly from a policy perspective, factors that reduce the payoff 
to the threatening party from affecting the threatened outcome, reduce 
the credibility of the threat. 
 One major credibility-affecting factor is the legal 
repercussions of executing the threat. In many contexts the 
threatened outcome will be in violation of a legal norm and 
will thus entail a legal sanction. If A threatens to kill B 
unless B gives A all his money, then execution of the threat 
will entail a severe criminal sanction. In  
Example 1, where A threatens to breach his contract with B unless B 
concedes to a price modification, the execution of the threat will 
invoke contractual remedies for breach of the initial contract. 
Generally speaking, when a substantial sanction can be expected to 
follow the execution of the threat, the credibility of this threat will be 
reduced. 
Importantly, however, credibility is affected not by some 
theoretical legal sanction that the threatened party is hypothetically 
entitled to invoke, but rather by the effective sanction that the 
threatening party expects to bear. Thus, in the contract modification 
case the seller’s threat would more likely be credible if an economic 
downturn had rendered the seller incapable of paying damages. The 
judgment-proof problem is a key factor affecting the credibility of a 
threat to breach, as well as the credibility of any other threat to inflict 
an illegal outcome. If the principal means to deter threats is a 
monetary fine imposed for the execution of the threat, the capacity of 
an insolvent threatening party to pay this fine will determine the 
credibility of the threat. Beyond insolvency, the power of legal 
sanctions to reduce credibility is weakened by a host of other factors. 
                                                                                                                  
7  This example is based on Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Ct. Civ. App., 
Tx, 1949). 
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First, there is normally a significant delay between the benefit derived 
from the execution of the threat and the legal sanction, a delay caused 
by back-logged courts. Second, even if legal sanctions take the form 
of delay-free out-of-court settlements, as is often the case, settlement 
amounts may be lower than the expected judgment at trial, further 
qualifying the credibility-reducing power of the legal sanction. 8 
 While formal legal sanctions are of central importance, they 
are by no means the only and in some cases not even the most 
important credibility-affecting factor. Social norms and extra legal 
sanctions also affect the payoff attached to an executed threat. For 
instance, if A threatens to breach a contract unless B agrees to a price 
modification, A might be subject to non- legal sanctions in the form of 
trade reduction by third parties, reputational harms and the like, which 
may, even in the absence of legal liability, render the threat non-
credible.9  
 Reputational concerns may also work to bolster a threat’s 
credibility. A threat that would be costly to execute (due to, say, high 
legal sanctions) or which induces an act that generates a relatively 
minor benefit to the threatening party, may nevertheless be credible 
once repeat play dynamics and reputation-building concerns are taken 
into account. Consider a party, A, who engages in repeat contractual 
interactions. A may benefit from establishing a reputation for carrying 
out his threats—a reputation which would allow A to intimidate 
future negotiation counterparts and to extract better terms in each 
contractual transaction. When A threatens to walk away from a 
profitable deal unless B concedes a price which makes the deal even 
more profitable for A, the threat might seem non-credible. After all, 
carrying it out would mean forgoing the profit from the deal. But, if 
this one deal is but a first step in a reputation-building (or reputation 
maintenance) strategy, vis-à-vis B or third parties, which will ensure 
that future bargainers would view A’s threat as credible, then walking 
away can suddenly become a profit- increasing strategy. The 
immediate loss in forgoing the present transaction must now be 
balanced against the expected stream of improved terms that A, 
equipped with more intimidating reputation, would be able to secure. 
Often the latter benefit will dominate the former cost, making the 
threat to walk away credible.10 
                                                 
8 For a detailed analysis of these factors, see Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 
The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. __ 
(2004).  
9 Reputation effects may be sensitive to the specific circumstances leading to the 
breach of contract. If, for example, A’s request for modification of the original 
contract was based on an unexpected cost increase, which according to industry 
norms justifies a modification of the initial agreement, than A may be able to breach 
without suffering any reputational penalty. For a thorough account of reputation 
sanctions, see, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Value Creation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 
(2001). 
10 In particular, the long-term reputation benefit will dominate the short-term cost 
when the threatening party’s discount rate is low, that is, if he is “patient” enough to 
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Importantly, however, reputation-based credibility is 
endogenous to the legal regime. That is, the rules determining what 
constitutes duress are one of the factors that can affect the credibility 
of the threat. In particular, reputation concerns can bolster the 
credibility of a threat only if those future deals that are influenced by 
a party’s reputation are themselves enforceable. If the law refuses to 
enforce concessions that resulted from threats there is no point in 
building a reputation for carrying out intimidating threats, because 
future concessions extracted by such threats will also, under the same 
law, be un-enforceable. The credibility-generating role of reputation 
would disappear. In the above example, A’s incentive to walk away 
from the current deal when his terms were not accepted had to do with 
the gain from future, enforceable deals that will have similar terms. 
Non-enforcement of the current as well as the future deals can 
effectively deter A from acting in a coercive manner. His threat will 
cease to be credible.  
 As suggested by the preceding discussion, the legal and extra 
legal implications of carrying out the threat are the main factors that 
determine the credibility of a threat. However, the payoff that the 
threatening party expects if he were to withdraw the threat is always 
the benchmark against which the execution payoff is measured. 
Therefore, this benchmark payoff clearly affects the credibility of the 
threat. In particular, if the threatening party expects a low benchmark 
payoff, then a lower execution payoff will be required to generate a 
credible threat. Consider, for example, a supplier that operates in a 
competitive market, enjoying only a narrow profit margin. If this 
supplier faces an unexpected cost increase, he is relatively more likely 
to end-up with a credible threat to breach absent a modification (as 
compared to a monopolist that enjoys a larger profit margin), even if 
this breach would trigger contractual liability.  
 Non-pecuniary costs and benefits may also play an important 
role in determining the benchmark payoff. In the contract 
modification example, if the seller had no way of anticipating or 
preventing the cost increase, and if absent a modification this cost 
increase would leave the seller with a loss while the buyer makes a 
nice profit, the seller may deem the deal to be unfair. Performance of 
the unmodified contract may thus impose on the seller not only 
pecuniary costs but also non-pecuniary costs arising from the 
experience of being treated unfairly. Consequently, the seller may be 
willing to carry out a threat even in the presence of significant legal 
sanctions, to avoid the emotional burden of dealing under unfair 
terms. Such non-pecuniary costs may well tip the credibility scale 
from non-credible to credible.11 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
sacrifice some immediate profit for future profits. See generally Drew FUDENBERG 
& JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY, ch. 9 (1991). 
11 See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an “Irrational” Breach of 
Contract , 11 SUPR. CT . ECON. REV. 143 (2004). 
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B. Coercion and Credibility 
 
 To better understand the relationship between the concept of 
coercion and the concept of credibility, we begin with the case of a 
non-credible threat.  
 
Example 3: The Highwayman Case. A, a highwayman, 
stops, B, a traveler at gunpoint and threatens to kill B 
unless B turn over all the money that B is carrying with him 
to A.  
 
Assume initially that A’s threat is not credible. Namely, given 
A’s anticipation of the likelihood of being caught and (severely) 
punished if he were to kill B (in the case where B refuses to turn over 
the money), A would withdraw rather than execute his threat and 
shoot B. In other words, A is bluffing. If B knew that A’s threat is not 
credible, B would not succumb to A’s demand and would call the 
bluff. At least under our benchmark assumption of complete 
information, credibility is a necessary condition for coercion. A threat 
known to be non-credible cannot and will not coerce. 
Now assume that the highwayman is operating in a lawless 
land, where the threat of capture and punishment is minimal. Under 
this alternative assumption it may well be that if B refuses to pay-up, 
A will in fact kill B. The payoff from doing this—the money that A 
will be able to take from his victim—would exceed the expected cost 
of the sanction. Facing a credible threat, B knows that he has only two 
choices: to give-up his money or to be killed by A. B prefers the 
former and thus A’s threat will be successful in extracting money 
from B. A credible threat is able to coerce. If A credibly threatens to 
do X (kill B) unless B does Y (surrenders his money), and if B prefers 
Y over X, then A’s threat will coerce B to do Y. The fact that B 
prefers yet a third outcome, Z (not be killed and not surrender his 
money), is irrelevant. When A’s threat is credible, Z is not attainable. 
In terms of the game tree in Figure 1, when A’s threat is credible 
(when xA > 0), B’s choice is between yB and xB. Both may be “bad,” 
relative to the benchmark of 0 (if A were to withdraw the threat), but 
B’s only power is to choose the lesser of two evils. 
 The preceding discussion assumed complete information, at 
least with respect to the credibility dimension. Namely, it was 
assumed that B could distinguish a credible threat from a non-credible 
bluff. While this assumption will likely hold true in some cases, there 
are other cases in which it is not apparent whether the threat is 
credible. Even in these cases, though, the benchmark insight above 
holds: only a threat that is perceived to be credible has the power to 
coerce. A threat can induce B to surrender only if B perceives a great 
enough risk that the threat is credible. In this asymmetric information 
environment, however, a bluff can be mistaken for a credible threat 
and can induce surrender. It is only in these situations—non-credible 
13
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threats that were perceived to be credible and succeeded to coerce—
that the law may step in and nullify the consequences of the coercion. 
We discuss this claim in the next section. 
 
C. Relief from the Consequences of a Coerced Act or Promise 
 
 As explained, the credibility of a threat depends on the 
comparison between the two courses of action available to the 
threatening party in the event that the threat was rejected: carrying out 
the threat versus retracting it. If the threat was “commit act Y or else 
some consequence X would be imposed,” once the threat was rejected 
and act Y was not committed, the threatening party will carry out the 
threat only if the threatened consequence X raises his utility (if xA > 
0). Importantly, whether a threat is credible does not depend on 
anything that could potentially happen when the threat is successful. 
In particular, it does not depend on the benefit to the threatening party 
from act Y,  or on any policy designed to relieve the consequences of a 
coerced act or promise.  
 Ex-post relief from the consequences of a coerced act or 
promise is counter productive in combating coercion because it does 
not affect the credibility of the threat. If a credible threat exists, such a 
policy of ex-post relief can, at most, uproot the strategy of extracting 
benefits through threats. The threatening party would realize that it is 
pointless to try to secure gains via threats, as such gains would be 
stripped in accordance with the ex post relief policy. He would then 
have to choose whether or not to commit X—the act that he would 
otherwise be willing to trade away—and, when xA > 0, he would 
indeed commit X. In situations in which the threat would have been 
credible, the threatened consequence would be carried out without 
offering an opportunity to avoid it.  
Consider the usury case under the assumption that A has a 
credible threat not to provide the $25 loan unless B promises to repay 
$2,000 after the war. Since A’s threat is credible and B is in dire need 
of the $25 loan, B will make the promise. It is conventionally 
suggested that the law should deny enforcement of B’s coerced 
promise, and thus undo the adverse consequences of A’s coercive 
conduct.12 This relief policy would often take the form of reducing 
B’s obligation below the coercive $2,000.13 However, in situations in 
which A’s threat is credible, such an ex post remedy would not only 
fail to help the coerced party, B, but it would in fact hurt her. The 
credibility of A’s threat implies that absent a guarantee of receiving 
$2,000 after the war A would not provide the loan. But, if the law is 
not expected to enforce B’s promise to repay $2,000, B cannot 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., FRIED, supra  note 3, at 109-111 (criticizing the ruling in Batsakis v. 
Demotsis). 
13 Indeed, the trial court in the case Bataskis v. Demotsis reduced the promisor’s 
obligation from $2,000 to $750. In the appeal, however, the $2,000 obligation was 
reinstated, not on the basis of credibility analysis, but on the basis of the court’s 
reluctance to scrutinize the adequacy of consideration. 
14
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guarantee the $2,000 repayment. The result is that A would not 
provide the loan. True, B would have preferred a less expensive loan. 
But when A’s threat is credible, A would not go along with a cheaper 
loan. Given this constraint, B has indicated that he prefers the 
expensive loan over no loan at all. The law’s refusal to enforce the 
expensive/coercive loan would not provide B with a less expensive 
loan. It would leave B with no loan at all.  
 To further illustrate the harm of the ex-post anti-duress 
remedy, consider the following hypothetical suggested by Robert 
Nozick.14 
 
Example 4: The Flogged Slave Case. A, a slave owner, 
flogs his slave, B, every day. One day A proposes to B that 
if B performs a certain unpleasant act, Y, he will stop 
beating him. B performs Y. Was B coerced?  
 
Surely, a slave’s existence is one of continuous coercion, and 
in discussing his well being it would be odd to isolate but one instance 
of coercion. Still isolating this particular event can help us distinguish 
the ways in which legal policy can, and in the ways in which it 
cannot, help the coerced party. 15  Here, B was given a choice, which 
itself may or may not deepen his duress. Our argument is the 
following. If A’s threat to proceed with the daily beating of B unless 
B performs Y is credible, B’s interest (evidenced by his choice to 
perform Y) is to avoid the beating, even at the cost of the requested 
act. If B can invoke an anti-coercion relief policy to undo his 
acquiescence (or get any form of remedy for it), it would only deprive 
him of the opportunity to escape the beating. That is, B does not have 
a third alternative, the “ideal” one, of avoiding both the beating and 
the obligation to commit Y. If B were to have the law on his side, 
granting him relief from his coerced acquiescence, A would anticipate 
that B would be likely to seek this relief and A would not offer the 
deal in the first place. Saying that A has a credible threat means that if 
A expects B to undo his acquiescence, he would simply proceed to 
apply the beating. B’s interest cannot be served by allowing him to 
invoke such ex-post relief measures.16 
 Another way to restate this argument is to note the tension 
between B’s ex-post and ex-ante interest. Ex-post, after performing 
the act and inducing A to refrain from beating—that is, after getting 
his side of the “bargain”—B prefers to undo the act Y. He can now 
enjoy the best of both worlds: no beating, no Y. Ex ante, however, his 
                                                 
14 Nozick, supra  note 3, at 450.  
15 We understand Nozick’s interest in the slave example to be similarly “sterile,” 
using this extreme scenario to flesh out defining characteristics of coercion. See 
Nozick, supra  note 3. 
16 This is not an argument that society cannot help coerced parties such as slaves. It 
is merely an argument that ex-post relief of the coerced act would not be of much 
help. See infra  Section II.F for the discussion of policies that could be effective in 
combating coercion. 
15
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
 CREDIBLE COERCION 13 
situation is not as bright, because at this moment in time A still has 
control over the set of choices available to B. Thus, ex-ante B does 
not have the ability to enjoy both worlds, he must choose one of them 
or else—if A’s threat is credible—end up with ‘beating’ being chosen 
for him. The only way B can avoid this is by making the surrendered 
act non-relievable. 
 The reason that the ex-post anti-coercion measures are futile is 
that they do not address the source of the slave’s problem. It is not the 
deal that the slave struck that is responsible for the coercion, but 
rather the initial unequal allocation of power, the relative starting 
points of the “negotiation,” that are coercive. The expectation of daily 
beatings is the manifestation of coercion, not the proposal of an arms 
length “bargain.” A social policy of undoing the deal, which does not 
purport to address the unequal starting points that gave rise to this 
deal in the first place, is futile in helping the slave.  
 
D. Non-Credible Threats 
 
When coercion arises from a credible threat, we argued, an ex-
post remedy would not be of much help to the threatened party. But 
coercion may also arise from a threat that was not credible, a bluff, 
which was mistakenly perceived to be credible by the threatened 
party. The traveler who surrenders to the highwayman at gunpoint 
may doubt the credibility of the threat to pull the trigger, but as long 
as he perceives at least some chance that it is credible—that it would 
be carried out if he were to reject it—he might be coerced to turn over 
his money. 
In these situations, an ex-post remedy can help the coerced 
party. If a court can confirm that the threat to which the coerced party 
surrendered was not credible, it can undo the consequences of the 
coercion and provide a meaningful remedy. Unlike the case of 
credible threats, in the case of bluffs the anticipation of this ex-post 
intervention would not induce the threatening party to carry out his 
threat ex-ante, but rather to refrain from making it in the first place. 
He would realize that he cannot secure any advantage by coercion, 
and would thus prefer not to make the threat. Stated differently, if 
non-credibility is known to be verifiable ex-post, the threatened 
party’s imperfect information at the time she needs to evaluate the 
threat is immaterial from an incentive point of view. Under a regime 
that undoes the consequences of non-credible coercion, the threatened 
party effectively “postpones” her decision whether to surrender until 
the time at which the court will make the accurate observation of 
whether the threat was credible.  
Hence, when threats are non-credible, courts can effectively 
undo the consequences of coercion. However, it should also be clear 
that the more apt courts are in evaluating credibility, the greater the 
incidence of credible coercion that they will face (and which they will 
correctly decide not to nullify). The reason for this counter- intuitive 
claim is the following: If courts are expected to verify credibility and 
16
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nullify the consequences of non-credible threats, parties whose threats 
are not credible will not bother to make them. Thus, those cases in 
which surrender occurs and which eventually reach courts are much 
more likely to involve credible threats.  
While ex-post relief can be effective in the case of non-
credible coercion, this does not mean that any time a party utilizes 
“bluffs” the court ought to intervene. Our argument is narrower; it 
merely says that if courts want to intervene, they can effectively do so 
only when the threat was non-credible. In other words, non-credibility 
is a necessary condition for the  effectiveness of legal intervention. It 
is surely not sufficient. To illustrate this distinction, consider the 
following familiar example. 
 
Example 5: Penny Black. One stamp collector offers 
another a “Penny Black” at a steep price, knowing that the 
buyer needs just this stamp to complete a set.17 
 
The seller is making a threat: “unless you pay me the steep 
price, I will not let you have the stamp.” If this threat is credible, legal 
intervention in the form of ex-post price reduction is harmful to the 
buyer, since the seller will prefer not to sell. If, instead, the seller’s 
threat is non-credible—a mere bluff, as is commonly observed in 
arms length negotiations—ex-post price reduction would not deter the 
seller from trading. The seller might be willing to pursue the 
transaction even if he anticipates the possibility of a court-mandated 
price reduction. Nevertheless, even though intervention could be 
effective, it is not clear that coercion is present and that the law 
should intervene. Any used car sale involves similar negotiation 
techniques in which a party “threatens” to walk away unless some 
stated price is accepted. Often, these threats are bluffs, yet the 
resulting transaction does not usually give rise to legal intervention. 
Non-credibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
intervention. The credibility inquiry supplements (or, more precisely, 
it is preliminary to) the substantive weighing of the consequences, it 
does not substitute it. Legal policy must be based on a normative 
guideline determining which consequences are so objectionable that 
intervention is called for. The credibility criterion does not provide 
such a normative guideline; it merely identifies the situations in which 
intervention in the form of ex-post relief is not likely to advance the 
underlying normative principle. 
 
E. Credibility-Enhancing Investments 
 
We have thus far assumed that a threat is either credible or 
non-credible, as an exogenous matter. In many cases this assumption is 
perfectly valid. A party may inadvertently arrive at a situation where 
                                                 
17 FRIED, supra note 3, at 95. 
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he is in a position to make a credible threat. Consider again Example 
1, in which a supplier threatens to breach a supply contract unless the 
buyer acquiesces to a price modification. 18  
Contract law often considers this price modification to be 
coercive and unenforceable. Specifically, after describing this 
example, the Restatement of Contracts instructs that since “B has no 
reasonable alternative, A's threat amounts to duress, and the 
modification is voidable by B.” But consider A’s position. In many 
situations, A’s “improper threat to refuse to deliver” is associated with 
a cost increase and other adverse market shifts which A suffered after 
the original contract was signed. A, who at this stage might be on the 
brink of bankruptcy, could be making a credible threat to breach. If he 
did not anticipate the market shift and if he had no influence on its 
occurrence, his threat is “exogenously credible.” Its credibility is 
exogenous—namely, independent of the legal rules of duress—
because it is a result of factors which the threatening party had no hand 
in creating (nor an incentive to create). The threat to breach would 
remain credible even if he knew for certain that the resulting 
modification is unenforceable. 
 There is, however, a second group of cases, in which 
credibility is not the inadvertent result of circumstances beyond the 
control of the threatening party, but rather the result of a deliberate 
choice by the threatening party to make his threat more imposing. 
 
Example 6: Blackmail. A threatens to publish harmful 
information regarding B’s past unless B pays him a 
significant amount of money. 19 
 
Blackmail is a typical act of coercion. It might also be an act 
of credible coercion: now that he possesses the harmful information, it 
is costless for him to publish it, and he might benefit from doing so by 
gaining an intimidating reputation, even if he already failed to extract 
hush money. Yet the credibility of A’s threat is a result of his decision 
to acquire the harmful information in the first place. If the law were to 
invalidate the deal and force A to return the money paid to him, 
parties like A might find it less profitable to invest in acquiring the 
harmful information, ex-ante. When the information was acquired 
deliberately, credibility is endogenous—it is a result of factors which 
the threatening party created—and legal measures for ex-post relief 
can serve B’s interest.20 Stated differently, if the acquisition of 
                                                 
18 This example was based on Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 cmt. b, ill. 
5, describing a common scenario dealt with by the doctrines of duress and 
modification.   
19 FRIED, supra note 3, at 96-103. See also  Nozick, supra note 3, at 452. 
20 Fried similarly argues against enforcement of B’s coerced promise on the basis of 
the endogenous credibility perspective. “In condemning blackmail we exclude the 
use of property (including property in one’s effort [i.e. the effort of gathering the 
harmful information]) for the general purpose of harming others; we exclude 
18
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information is deliberate, A’s enterprise of investing in gathering 
libelous information for the purpose of blackmail can be deterred if 
the law were to deprive A of the gains from this enterprise. 
In the case of exogenous credibility, given the existence of a 
credible threat, we have shown that in order to serve the well-being of 
the coerced party the law should enforce the coerced promise and 
refuse to otherwise nullify coerced acts. This prescription must now 
be qualified. When the threatening party can take initial actions and 
investments that are intended to enhance the credibility of his 
subsequent threats—such that would enable him to effectively extract 
a coerced act or promise—the law may be able to deter such actions 
by nullifying the coerced act or promise. That is, if courts can 
differentiate their treatment of coerced acts, and selectively validate 
only those that are a result of exogenous, inadvertent credibility (like 
the cost- increase case), while invalidating coerced acts that where 
extracted by “manufactured” credibility, the incentives to invest in 
credibility enhancing actions will diminish. Credibility that is 
endogenous—that may or may not emerge depending on the legal 
policy towards the gains that it achieves—can effectively be uprooted 
by standard ex-post anti-coercion remedies.21 
 In fact, many cases that at first appear to exhibit exogenous 
credibility may reveal deliberate acts or choices without which there 
would have been no credible threat. These are cases in which the 
threatening party deliberately assumes a certain role or places himself 
in a certain position that later allows for the generation of credible 
threats. The highwayman case is such a case. Looking at the 
highwayman pointing a gun at the innocent traveler it would seem 
that the credibility of the threat to kill the traveler is an inadvertent 
consequence of the surrounding circumstances, e.g., the failing law 
enforcement. But, from a broader perspective it is the actor’s 
deliberate choice to become a highwayman and hold-up travelers that 
put him in a position to take advantage of these circumstances and 
make credible threats. Likewise, the supplier’s threat to breach, 
although coming in the aftermath of an exogenous cost increase, is 
credible also because the supplier initially agreed to charge a price 
only slightly above his anticipated cost. If the supplier knows that a 
price modification would not be enforceable he would initially charge 
a higher price, reducing the chance that any future cost increase 
would give him a credible threat to breach. 
 Finally, consider the case in which the supplier’s cost increase 
is not exogenous (as in the case of a market shift), but rather a result 
of a business decision he made. For example, the cost increase may be 
due to higher than expected input costs because the supplier decided 
to produce the input in-house, rather than use sub-contractors. After 
                                                                                                                  
investments in the harmful potential of things, effort, or talent.” FRIED, supra note 
3, at 102. 
21 Cf. The Selmer Company v. Blakeslee-Midwest Company, 704 F.2d 924 (1983) 
(“Such promises are made unenforceable in order to discourage threats by making 
them less profitable.”)  
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the realization of this cost increase, the supplier indeed has a credible 
threat to breach, and may extract a modification. But if the 
modification were unenforceable, the supplier would realize, at the 
time of selecting his inputs, that he would not be able to roll the costs 
of higher inputs onto the buyer, and would instead choose the cheaper 
inputs. In terms of credibility, while the supplier’s threat given the 
choice of inputs may be credible, his hypothetical threat evaluated at 
the time of input choice, is not. Namely, if the supplier were to know 
that the modification would be unenforceable, he would not incur the 
high cost and would perform the original contract. 
The possibility of endogenous credibility moderates the 
skeptical tone voiced thus far. It implies that traditional ex-post 
measures aimed at the consequences of duress can be effective in 
reducing the incidence of duress. But while the legal policy 
conclusion ought to be qualified in this fashion, our main 
methodological argument holds just the same: in order to ascertain 
whether coerced parties benefit from ex-post intervention, we must 
engage in credibility-of-threats analysis. It is this type of analysis, 
nuanced and complex as it might be, that determines the efficacy of 
legal intervention. 
  
F. Credibility-Reducing Policies 
 
The credibility criterion might prescribe policies that are in 
sharp contrast to those derived from other normative criteria. In fact, 
Section II of the Article will be devoted to exploring this possible 
tension between the credibility criterion and other normative criteria, 
and to defend the proposed primacy of the credibility criterion. Our 
analysis would thus reach a junction in which coercion could be both 
credible and immoral. It is here that our skeptical argument bears 
most relevance, suggesting that the intuitive inclination to “do 
something” to combat coercion may lead to counter-productive 
measures. 
This argument does not mean, however, that society should 
encourage the coercive act, or even accept it as a moral necessity.  
True, given the credibility of the threat, the coerced party is better off 
with a choice to surrender, and this choice ought to be enforceable for 
it to exist. But to the extent that a negative moral judgment 
concerning the threat as a coercive act remains, society can utilize 
other institutions—criminal sanctions, non-legal sanctions, remedies 
for breach, etc’—to directly influence the credibility of the threat and 
thus its incidence. When the carrying out of a threat (“your money or 
your life”) is subject to criminal sanctions, its credibility diminishes. 
If other threats (“pay me more or I will breach the agreement”) are 
subject to summarily enforced fully-compensatory remedies or to 
heavy non- legal sanctions by future traders, their credibility similarly 
diminishes.  
 Our analysis suggests that coercion can be prevented, and the 
welfare of the threatened party improved, if society were to utilize 
20
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credibility-reducing policies. Policies that reduce the payoff to the 
threatening party if he chooses to carry out the threat are a primary 
means of reducing the credibility of the threat. Note, however, that 
these policies are different than ones aimed at reducing the payoff to 
the threatening party in the event that the threat was successful. Such 
post-surrender penalties do not affect the credibility of the threat and, 
as argued above, would only induce parties with credible threats to 
carry out their intentions without bothering to make the threat. 
Credibility-diminishing policies should target the threatening party’s 
hypothetical payoffs in the event that the threat failed, to affect his 
choice between carrying out his threat versus retracting it.  
 To combat the highwayman problem, the optimal policy is to 
increase the likelihood of apprehending murderers and bringing them 
to justice as well as to increase the sanction for murder, not to allow 
victims to sue for restitution of their robbed possessions. If a 
highwayman expects to suffer severe criminal penalties, the threat to 
shoot, that might otherwise be credible, would become non-credible 
and the highwayman will be deterred from making it in the first place. 
If, instead, the highwayman expects to be liable in restitution, he will 
only be induced to carry out his credible threat.  
In contract law, the credibility of the coercive threat can be 
reduced by various policies. A common type of threat is to breach an 
already existing contract unless the threatened party agrees to modify 
the terms. The more severe the remedies that the threatening party 
expects to bear in case of breach, the less credible his threat. A high 
damage measure, however, while clearly a necessary condition for 
diminishing credibility, is not a sufficient condition for the deterrence 
of threats to breach. If the aggrieved party cannot readily collect such 
damages, due to litigation and collection costs, or due to insolvency of 
the threatening party, remedies for breach would not deter the 
threatening party from carrying out his threat and the credibility of his 
threat would remain un-diminished. Nevertheless, the legal treatment 
of contractual duress should be aimed at changing the ex-ante 
calculus of the threatening party, not at relieving coerced parties from 
contractual liability ex-post. 
Credibility-reducing policies are not always available and are 
rarely perfect. Whenever coercion arises from fundamental inequality 
between the parties’ starting points (as, say, in the slave example, and, 
perhaps, in the usury example), credibility-reducing measures involve 
a much greater social effort than merely sanctioning the threatening 
party. If a lender monopolizes the capital market and extracts usurious 
interest rates, sanctioning him for setting such rates or for failing to 
make cheaper credit available might not help potential borrowers 
much. Such policies do nothing to resolve the underlying market 
structure which gave rise to the unequal bargaining positions. Short of 
price regulation or complete scrutiny of the content of allocations, 
there is not much that legal doctrine can do. As Professor Leff 
recognized, while we might have the urge to leave it for the parties to 
set their terms but impose fairness oriented constraints, “we cannot 
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have both at the same time.”22 So while the main lesson of credibility 
analysis is in marking the limits of social intervention, the agenda it 
sets is constructive. It channels society’s urge to help coerced parties 
away from ineffective efforts. 
 
II. CREDIBLE COERCION VERSUS OTHER PRINCIPLES OF COERCION 
 
A. The “Inevitability” of the Credibility Criterion 
  
After introducing the credibility criterion in Part I, Part II of 
the Article proceeds to explore the proper role of this criterion vis-à-
vis other normative theories of coercion. The main argument 
developed in this Part is that credibility analysis is inevitable in any 
coercion discussion. Regardless of any normative theory of coercion, 
credibility analysis provides a necessary perspective, one that could 
significantly complement or limit the pragmatic validity of other 
theories. 
 The credibility criterion is, loosely speaking, an “incentive-
compatibility” constraint. It tells us whether some socially desired 
outcomes are feasible—are they compatible with the incentives of the 
threatening party. What it adds, in other words, is a “positive,” or 
descriptive, perspective. The credibility criterion is the single factor 
that determines whether the ideal outcome for the coerced party—
namely avoiding both the coerced act or promise and the outcome 
threatened to be inflicted if the act or promise are not surrendered—is 
attainable. It tells us that if the threat is credible, this ideal outcome is 
not attainable. Under such circumstances, it would be in the interest of 
the surrendering party that the act or promise be held valid and legally 
enforceable, even if it is coercive under some normative criterion. 
 This descriptive understanding of the threatening party’s 
incentives is inevitable because choosing to ignore it would not make 
it go away. If an ideal outcome is not feasible, not attainable, there is 
no point in advocating it. To the extent that we choose a different, 
normatively appealing approach to the characterization of coercion, 
and decide whether to enforce a deal on the basis of an autonomy-
based criterion for example, it would still be the incentives of the 
threatening party that determine whether the outcome would indeed 
promote the rights of the coerced party. If, say, society decides not to 
enforce a deal reached under a credible threat, on the basis that the 
threat constituted contractual duress, it cannot escape the outcome 
that the threatening party would end up carrying out his threat. As 
long as the credibility of the threat is undiminished, the policy may be 
counter-productive.  
In the reminder of this Part, we take a closer look of several 
prominent normative criteria of coercion, and explore their interaction 
with the credibility criterion.  
                                                 
22 Arthur A. Leff, Thomist Unconscionability, 4 CANADIAN BUS. L. J. 424 (1979). 
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B. The Credibility Principle versus the “Involuntariness” 
Criterion 
 
 Most legal and normative accounts of coercion focus on the 
voluntariness of the act or promise that were undertaken in the 
shadow of a threat. If the act or promise was voluntary—if other, 
reasonable courses of action were open to the threatened party—there 
is no coercion. Conversely, if the act or promise was involuntary, then 
it was coerced, leading to the conc lusion that the consequences—
moral and legal—of the coerced act or promise should be nullified. 
 We argue that, for the purpose of granting relief to the party 
under pressure, voluntariness analysis is incomplete if it is not 
informed by credibility analysis. Technically, the threatened party’s 
choice is always voluntary. Even the traveler who surrenders all his 
money to the gun pointing highwayman is acting voluntarily in 
choosing the better course of action. 23 Involuntariness, then, must 
stand for a normative judgment concerning the restrictions put on the 
choice set that this party is facing. If all choices are bad, so goes the 
involuntariness test, choosing one over another does not represent 
free, voluntary action. Some other alternative, a better one, should 
have been made available to the coerced party for the choice to be 
voluntary in a meaningful, rights-oriented, sense. But while such 
“other alternative” might ideally exist, it is the credibility test that 
determines whether it is feasible, whether it pragmatically exists. If 
the threat is credible, then it rules out, as a descriptive matter, the 
threatened party’s more favorable choices, leaving her with a choice 
between only two alternatives: to undertake the demanded act or 
promise, or to suffer the consequences of the carried-out threat.  
 To illustrate this claim that incentive and credibility analysis 
is, in some sense, “preliminary” to the voluntariness inquiry, consider 
the following example. 
 
Example 7: Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.24 
Williams, a mother of seven children with low income, 
regularly purchased furniture and home appliances from a 
seller on installment credit. The seller, the only retailer for 
such items in the neighborhood, required buyers to secure 
the debt with the following provision: until the buyer 
                                                 
23 As Charles Fried puts it: “If a promisor knows what he is doing, if he fully 
appreciates the alternatives and chooses among them, how can it even be correct to 
say that his was not a free choice?” FRIED, supra note 3, at 94. See also  Anthony 
Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 477-78 (1980); 
John Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N. CAR. L. REV. 237, 239-40 
(1942); John Dawson, Economic Duress: An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. 
REV. 253, 267 (1947); Robert Lee Hale, Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 616-17 (1943). 
24 350 F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also  Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 
264 (Sup. Ct., 1969). 
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brought her total unpaid balance on every single item to 
zero, the seller could repossess any and every item 
purchased in the store in the past. And when Williams 
missed a payment the seller sought to invoke this 
repossession provision. 
 
The case was decided by the DC Circuit on the basis of the 
unconscionability doctrine, involving reasoning that resounds the 
involuntariness analysis. The majority, as did many commentators 
since, raises the possibility that Williams’ acquiescence to the harsh 
terms was not voluntary. Williams ought to have a choice to make 
purchases not subject to such coercive, or unconscionable, terms. 
Credibility analysis, however, could teach us that such choice is 
probably not feasible. If the seller’s implicit threat, “sign these terms 
or else I will not sell to you” is credible, Williams does not have a 
‘better choice’—to purchase the same items without harsh credit 
terms.25 
Leading commentators often overlook this constraint. Charles 
Fried, for example, argued that the court should have enforced the 
contract in Example 7.26 Fried dismisses the involuntariness 
argument, by observing that “any consumer facing a perfectly 
competitive market for some necessity or set of necessities has no real 
choice but to pay the market price; just as the producers have no real 
choice but to accept that price.”27 At first, it seems that Fried is 
engaging in what looks like a credibility analysis. He recognizes the 
possibility that “the far greater frequency of default made high prices 
and harsh credit terms a necessity for doing business with an often 
nearly destitute clientele.”28 But, the subsequent discussion makes 
clear that Fried does not appreciate the centrality of the credibility 
principle. Fried does not limit enforcement of these harsh contracts to 
cases where less harsh terms would force the seller to refrain from 
selling or to charge higher prices/interest rates. His claim is much 
broader. Walker-Thomas, the retailer, has no duty of fairness to his 
poor customers.29 
Credibility analysis is neutral with respect to such normative 
judgments. It merely suggests that if the retailer’s threat not to sell for 
a lower price or with less harsh credit terms is credible, then non-
enforcement will not provide the consumer with more favorable 
terms. However, if the retailer would have made a profit even with a 
                                                 
25 For an analysis of cross-collateral provisions such as the one in the Williams case, 
see Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 
293, 306-308 (1975). 
26 FRIED, supra note 3, at 103-109. 
27 Id. at 104. 
28 Id. at 105. See also  Epstein, supra note 25, at 308-315 (discussing the economic 
and social backgrounds justifying harsh contract terms). 
29 FRIED, supra note 3, at 106 (“But there is no reason why the retailer or employer 
should assume more of a burden in this regard than, say, a Beverly Hills plastic 
surgeon with ten times their income, just because the surgeon never has occasion to 
deal with the poor and unemployed.”) 
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less stringent contract, such that his threat not to deal is not credible, 
then (and only then) can there be a debate whether other values justify 
non-enforcement. In the case of the Walker-Thomas retail store, the 
evidence is mixed. On the one hand, many of the items repossessed 
by the story had almost zero resale value.30 This suggests that the 
cross-collateral provision was not all that valuable to the seller. On 
the other hand, some of the repossessed goods did have non-trivial 
resale value. From the seller’s perspective at the time of the sale, the 
credit provision was a cost-reducing measure, and seemingly a much 
needed one. Economic indicators surveyed by the FTC showed that 
profit margins for such retailers were lower than those enjoyed by 
similar retailers in other demographic areas.31 The costs of loan 
collection and other labor and marketing costs for low-income 
neighborhood retailers reduced profits significantly below normal, 
such that any tinkering with the terms against the seller would drive it, 
in the long term, to shut down its business. Credibility here is 
exogenous: it is not the product of market manipulation by the seller, 
but rather a reflection of an environment in which the business of 
selling in low-income markets is costly. Accordingly, 
unconscionability standards applied by courts will only reduce, not 
increase, buyers’ choices.32 
To be sure, credibility analysis does not suggest that the 
unconscionability doctrine is useless. In cases, where the seller does 
not have a credible threat not to deal, namely where the seller would 
still profit under a less one-sided contract, unconscionability doctrine 
may provide consumers with a meaningful remedy. 33 We merely 
propose that the pro-consumer case can be made more effective if it is 
required to clear the credibility hurdle. 
                                                 
30 See Dostert, Appelate Restatement of Unconscionability: Civil Legal Aid at Work , 
54 A.B.A.J. 1183 (1968).  
31  See U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Installment Credit and 
Retail Sales Practices of District of Columbia Retailers (1968), excerpts reprinted in 
FULLER & EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 67-69 (7th ed. 2001). 
32 A reduction of buyers’ choices may be justified on paternalistic grounds. Buyers, 
who, as a result of inadequate education or poor social standing, are unable to make 
sensible choices concerning their consumption, can be made better off by additional 
constraints on their choice set. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 
F. 2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (referring to Williams’ lack of education and to her 
inability to understand the terms of the contract); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and 
Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to 
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982). 
For an alternative non-paternalistic justification for reducing buyers’ choices – see 
Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom 
of Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995).  
33 In particular, where the seller enjoys monopoly power it is more likely that the 
threat not to deal under less one-sided terms is not credible. Cf. Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (The existence if a cartel of auto 
manufacturers lead to pro-consumer intervention.) Similarly, in cases in which 
sellers exploit consumers ignorance and weakness of will, such as in door-to-door 
sales, prices may be set far above the normal-profit level. See, e.g., Jones v. Start 
Credit Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (NY 1969). 
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C. The Credibility Criterion versus Rights-Based Theories of 
Coercion 
 
Recognizing the weakness of the voluntariness principle, 
philosophers and legal scholars have proposed a methodology of 
evaluating the threatened party’s choice set against some normative 
baseline.34 By most accounts, this normative baseline represents a 
conception of basic rights—moral or legal—that a liberal society 
should endow every individual. If B has a right to be free from 
situation X, then his agreement to do Y in order to be freed from the 
threat of having X inflicted on her must result from (or, it is the 
definition of) coercion. 35  
To compare the credibility principle with this moral baseline 
approach to coercion, consider again Robert Nozick’s flogged slave 
example. The question, recall, is whether the law should accord the 
slave, who does Y to avoid the daily beating, the remedy of a release 
from the act. According to the rights-based approach, the slave has a 
fundamental right not to be beaten-up. This is, according to Nozick, 
the “morally expected course of events.”36 Hence, a deal in which the 
slave has to pay dearly in order to secure this right is coercive, and 
ought to be undone. While recognizing that the slave is subject to 
coercion and that he is entitled to be free from beating, we argued 
above that nullifying the coerced deal will only reduce the slave’s 
well-being. 37 If the slave-owner has a credible threat to continue with 
the daily beating, the slave would benefit from the option to undertake 
a less painful act or promise and escape the beating. Credibility 
analysis teaches that providing an ex-post remedy to the coerced slave 
strips away this valuable option. 
True, a rights-based approach can do what credibility analysis 
cannot: it can identify an incidence of coercion; it can distinguish 
types of pressure along criteria of moral legitimacy. It can tell us what 
may, and what may not, be extracted from an individual. But it is only 
the credibility analysis that can identify whether an ex-post remedy 
would be effective. The slave example demonstrates the tension 
between the two approaches. Whereas rights-based theorists would 
conclude that the coerced slave should be released from contractual 
accountability, we think otherwise. Whereas Nozick argues that “the 
slave himself would prefer the morally expected course of events” to 
                                                 
34 Some writers have argued that a morally-neutral baseline can be defined. See, 
e.g., David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers , 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121 (1981). 
The comparison with the credibility principle is largely independent of whether the 
baseline is rights-based or morally-neutral. 
35 FRIED, supra  note 3, at 95-103; JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, chs. 23, 24 
(1986); WERTHEIMER, supra note 3, at 450; Nozick, supra note 3, at 447. 
36 Nozick, supra note 3, at 450. 
37 See supra  Section I.C. 
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determine whether his promise is enforceable,38 we are confident that 
a slave facing a credible threat would actually prefer otherwise. 
It is tempting to object to this notion of credibility in the 
context of coercion. One’s fairness intuitions surely conflict with 
some of the skeptical claims that are bound to emerge from the 
rational choice methodology. Whether a threat is coercive or not, so 
goes the objection, should be determined on the basis of some 
normative baseline, not on the basis of incentives. Coercion should be 
a characterization of the wrongfulness of an act as derived from the 
moral fabric of our society, not of its incentive compatibility as 
determined by morally-neutral parameters. It is the aggrieved party’s 
fundamental rights that should be in the center of the coercion theory, 
not the wrongdoer’s idiosyncratic payoffs. Plainly, what is right or 
wrong should be differently determined than what is feasible. 
There are several ways to respond to this objection. Primarily, 
it should be highlighted that the credible coercion criterion does not 
purport to answer whether an act is coercive or whether it is morally 
wrong. It is wholly possible that an act of coercion would be both 
credible and yet morally wrong. What our analysis says is that if the 
purpose of identifying wrongful coercion is to accord some remedy to 
the coerced party, credible coercion is one place where such a purpose 
would be frustrated. When coercion is both credible and morally 
wrong, our conclusion that the coerced act should nevertheless be 
enforced merely suggests that, given the initial unequal allocation of 
power between the strong and the weak, non-enforcement would do 
nothing to improve the weak party’s position.  
Credibility analysis reaches policy conclusions that differ from 
other, normative analyses because it frames a different dilemma. 
Under a rights-based approach, for example, the outcome of the 
coercion is compared to the threatened party’s situation prior to the 
coercion in the “morally expected course of events.”39 If, as a result of 
the threat, the threatened party’s position becomes worse relative to 
this “pre-threat” baseline, the threat is coercive. Our analysis suggests 
that the correct baseline (for the purpose of granting an effective 
remedy) is not the position of the threatened party prior to the threat, 
but rather the position that she would be in if she were to reject the 
threat. This hypothetical future position takes the existence of a threat 
to be part of the unfortunate but relevant reality in which the dilemma 
has to be resolved. Only by comparison to this hypothetical future 
position can we tell whether the surrender to the threat hurt or 
improved the threatened party’s well-being. 
Given the potential discrepancy between credibility analysis 
and moral analysis of threats, what is the hierarchy between 
credibility and morality? Fried, for example, who, for the purpose of 
granting remedies against contractual duress, embraces a rights-based 
                                                 
38 Nozick, supra note 3, at 451. 
39 Nozick, supra note 3, at 450. Nozick considers also a non-moral baseline defined 
by “the normal course of affairs” Id.  
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normative criterion, acknowledges that some baseline must be 
provided to assess whether a proposal adds or reduces the options 
available to its recipient. Fried admits that a conception of coercion 
divorced from any normative baseline could be preferable.40 In his 
analysis, however, Fried cannot come up with such a morally 
“neutral” baseline, and thus considers it to be necessary to set up a 
normative baseline.41  
Our analysis can be viewed as a framework providing at least 
a preliminary factual baseline: when a threat is credible, it is a 
proposal that adds an option to the threatened party’s choice set; it 
does not reduce the threatened party’s alternatives. The determination 
of credibility is a factual one that does not require an identification of 
the threatened party’s moral entitlement. While it might be that the 
threatened party has a moral right not to suffer some threatened 
consequence, it might also be true that there is no way, given the 
existing distribution of powers for this party to avoid it other than by 
making an enforceable deal in which she surrenders other valuable 
rights or resources. While a coercion theory based on the threatened 
party’s initial bundle of rights would render such a deal immoral and 
unenforceable, our theory—having no such moral baseline—would 
make the deal enforceable (and would channel the social response 
against the immoral threat to other, more effective policies). 
Ironically, as we explained, this divorce of duress policy from the 
moral pre-disposition in favor of the coerced party only serves the 
well-being of this party. 
To be sure, credibility analysis leaves much room for a 
normative inquiry, even in pragmatic, policy-oriented contexts. While 
we argue that whenever a threat is credible the deal should be 
enforced, we do not argue that whenever a threat is not credible, the 
deal should not be enforced. Many deals are reached, and many acts 
are taken, as a result of pressure and threats that are not credible. But 
not all of them should be subject to social intervention—not all of 
them represent coercion. A normative theory is necessary to 
determine which among those non-credible threats are coercive. 
 
                                                 
40 FRIED, supra note 3, at 96 (“It would be nice if the benchmark for determining 
whether a proposal worsens the situation or not could be a purely factual one.”) See 
also  WERTHEIMER, supra note 3, at 8 (“[I] must be said that an empirical theory 
would be more attractive—if it turned out to be true.”) 
41 Similarly, Nozick finds the non-moral “normal course of affa irs” baseline 
inadequate (at least in certain cases), and resorts to a moral baseline (“the morally 
expected course of events.”) See Nozick, supra  note 3, at 450. 
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D. The Credibility Criterion versus Substantive Justice 
Approaches 
  
 A different approach to coercion focuses on the substantive 
fairness of the interaction. In particular, as applied in the contractual 
context, this approach views a threat as coercive if it results in a one-
sided transaction. This substantive justice criterion has multiple 
theoretical underpinnings. For instance, it has been argued that 
according to Hegelian principles of autonomy the free and equal 
personality of the two parties to a contract mandates equivalence in 
exchange.42 Alternatively, the substantive justice criterion has been 
traced back to Aristotelian corrective justice, which—designed to 
maintain the pre-existing distribution of wealth—requires equality of 
the values exchanged in the transaction. In a market-based economy, 
market prices are said to provide one benchmark for equality of 
exchange.43 Accordingly, coercion is manifested when a party 
exploits superior bargaining power to dictate terms that deviated from 
the prevalent market terms of exchange (if a market exists), or the 
hypothetical market terms (if a market does not exist). 
 From the credibility perspective, grounding coercion on 
theories of equivalence or equality in exchange is over-inclusive. It is 
over- inclusive, since a deal that violates exchange equality would be 
deemed coercive and unenforceable even if the advantaged party’s 
threat to walk away unless such terms are accepted were credible. 
Gordley, an advocate of the equality- in-exchange conception 
recognizes the possibility that the advantaged party would not be 
willing to exchange at the market price.44 But what is at stake in such 
a case, Gordley believes, is mainly the advantaged party’s autonomy. 
If the court reforms the contractual price and reverts it to the market 
price, the advantaged party is deprived of his autonomy to transact 
under his individually favored terms. Our analysis suggests, however, 
that in the case of a party not willing to exchange at the market 
price—the party who makes a threat to walk away unless a more 
favorable price is accepted—more than ex-post “autonomy 
deprivation” is at stake. The advantaged party’s ex-ante conduct is 
also likely to be affected. Anticipating that his advantage will be 
stripped away, the advantaged party would walk away from the 
contract.45 
 The discrepancy between the credibility criterion and the 
equality- in-exchange criterion can be narrowed down if the 
                                                 
42 See Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive 
Conception of Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989). 
43 See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1981).  
44 Gordley, id, at 1619. 
45 Gordley recognizes that a reasonable solution is to “enforce the contract at the 
price closest to the market price at which it is certain that the advantaged party 
would still have agreed to exchange.” Id., at 1620. However, he restricts this 
solution to a narrow set of circumstances, and favors a rule requiring the advantaged 
party to choose between a court-adjusted price or rescission of the contract in its 
entirety. 
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conception of equality incorporates some of the factors that are also 
relevant to determination of credibility. For example, if one party has 
a very attractive outside option whereas the other party does not, the 
terms of the exchange might be skewed in favor of the party with the 
attractive outside option. The resulting distribution of the surplus 
would not conflict with the principle of equality if it is based on the 
conception of “to each according to his sacrifice.” The party who 
forgoes a more attractive outside option in entering the exchange can 
be viewed as sacrificing more, thus deserving more. Hence, the value 
of the outside option, which is the major factor that would affect the 
credibility of the threat to refrain from dealing, is also the factor that 
would determine the normative account of whether the substantive 
terms are unequal. 
 In a similar vein, when markets are thin or inexistent and thus 
cannot provide a pragmatic benchmark of equality-of-exchange, other 
factors must be invoked. Gordley proposes that in such situations a 
party should be entitled to a price equal to “his costs plus whatever 
additional amount is necessary to ensure [tha t] he would willingly 
have contracted.”46 Thus, for example, in the famous case of the 
rescuing ship that salvaged the sinking ship’s cargo for a huge 
profit,47 the rescuer’s fee can be trimmed to equal its costs plus some 
bonus.48 This ex-post adjustment of the “price” is justified on equality 
grounds: the rescuer has no legitimate claim to the rescued property 
and thus his fee should not be measure by the property’s value. But it 
is also consistent with—and in fact it is tailored to satisfy—the 
incentive compatibility constraint. 
 All in all, although the two criteria may merge, the substantive 
equality criterion is nevertheless the one most sharply in conflict with 
the credibility criterion. Under this approach, the decision whether to 
grant the disadvantaged party relief depends solely on measuring how 
badly she is hurt by the contractual terms, and whether and why she 
was unable to protect herself. The perspective of the advantaged 
party—how his behavior would be affected by reformation of the 
contractual terms—is overlooked. Put differently, the substantive 
equality approach addresses a distributive concern: who is entitled to 
the benefits of the exchange. It is only a coincidence if this inquiry 
would reach the same conclusion as the incentive-oriented credibility 
criterion. 49 
 
E. The Credibility Criterion versus other Economic Approaches 
to Duress 
 
 The economic analysis of law has also proposed various 
criteria to identify a coercive interaction. A prominent economic 
                                                 
46 Id., at 1622. 
47 Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150 (1856). 
48 See infra Section III.F.  
49 For the view that the two perspectives rarely coincide, see Leff, supra  note 22. 
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justification for the duress doctrine focuses on ex-post allocative 
inefficiency. According to this view, the confidence that we would 
otherwise have, that voluntary choices increase the well-being of 
actors, is rebutted when the behavior results from duress. Thus, duress 
is a potential source of inefficient allocation: it threatens the 
applicability of Paretian concepts of welfare that are central to any 
economic theory of inter-subjective interaction. 50 In the contractual 
context, duress undermines the allocative efficiency guaranteed by 
voluntary exchange.51 
 The economic approach developed in this Article is different 
in that it focuses on ex-ante incentives rather than ex-post efficiency. 
This difference in perspective has numerous implications. For one, we 
have not invoked any efficiency criterion in defending the credibility 
principle. In fact, the only normative grounds we have invoked is the 
concern for the well-being of the threatened party.  
But the pragmatic difference between our approach and the 
ex-post efficiency approach is most conspicuous when coercive deals 
are ex-post inefficient but ex-ante credible. Namely, even if the threat 
not to deal is credible, it might nevertheless lead to a transaction that 
violates Pareto efficiency—one that involves a loss of welfare to the 
threatened party, relative to the pre-threat benchmark. According to 
the ex-post allocative view, such a transaction should be invalidated. 
According to the ex-ante credibility-oriented view, in contrast, the 
transaction should be enforced. The reason for this discrepancy, we 
know by now, is that the ex-post view utilizes a false benchmark. 
Under the ex-post view, the consequences for the threatened party are 
measured vis-à-vis his pre-threat well-being. 52 Indeed, the threatened 
party may be worse off relative to his pre-threat position. Under the 
credibility approach, the appropriate benchmark is not this pre-threat 
position but rather the post-threat hypothetical position. If the threat is 
credible, the threatened party’s welfare is improved relative to what it 
would be had the threat been carried out. 53 
                                                 
50 See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT  79 (1993). 
51 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 269-71 (4th ed., 
2003) 
52 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115 (6th Ed., 2003) (“We 
know that this class of contracts is nonoptimal because ex ante—that is, before the 
threat is made—if you asked the [threatened parties] of this world whether they 
would consider themselves better off if extortion flourished, they would say no.”); 
TREBILCOCK, supra note 50, at 84 (According to the “literal Paretian principle,” 
there is no coercion whenever the specific transaction renders “both parties to it 
better off, in terms of their subjective assessment of their own welfare, relative to 
how they would have perceived their welfare had they not encountered each other.”) 
53 This analysis asks whether, in the specific circumstance in which the threat was 
made, the threatened party’s well being would be advanced by anti-duress 
measures. A similar ex-ante view was proposed by Anthony Kronman. Kronman 
proposes that coercion be judged by what he calls a “modified Paretian principle.” 
Kronman’s approach goes beyond the specific interaction, asking whether the 
welfare of most people subject to this type of threat is likely, in the long-run, to be 
increased by nullifying the act or promise. See Kronman, supra  note 23. If we 
interpret Kronman’s “type of threat” in line with our approach, distinguishing 
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 Another insight from the existing economic analysis of duress 
concerns “rent-seeking costs.” It recognizes that if coercive threats 
were legal, parties would be driven to spend resources on precautions 
that would protect them against such threats (or on finding 
opportunities to make coercive threats).54 Nullifying the consequences 
of the threat would discourage the making of threats and thus reduce 
the need to invest in private anti-coercion measures. This ex-ante 
approach is an integral part of our endogenous credibility analysis.55 
Credibility can be the product of investments by both the threatening 
party and the threatened party.56 But credibility can also be the result 
of exogenous factors. Applying duress rules without accounting for 
these two sources of credibility, while discouraging wasteful 
investments in threats, can also deprive threatened parties of the 
power they would want to have, to acquiesce to exogenously credible 
threats.57 
 The possibility of subsequent threats might lead to ex-ante 
distortions beyond the wasteful investment in precaution. For 
example, in the contract modification context, the prospect of 
subsequent threats leading to modification of the initial contract might 
prevent the parties from implementing the efficient allocation of risks 
in the initial contract.58 Anticipated modification might also 
discourage value-enhancing reliance investments.59 While these 
distortions can be potentially significant, we demonstrated elsewhere 
that their magnitude is actually—and counter- intuitively—decreased 
under a regime that is founded on the credibility criterion. 60 When 
threats are credible, the only choice from a legal policy perspective is 
whether to enforce the coerced-into terms, or provide remedies for 
breach of the original terms. There is no third alternative of enforcing 
the original contract. Between the two feasible choices, breach is 
                                                                                                                  
between the credible type and the non credible type, we obtain a rough equivalence 
between the two approaches. Kronman’s approach is different than ours whenever a 
threat of the “credible type” turns out to be non-credible in a specific context, and 
visa versa. Moreover, while Kronman’s modified Paretian principle is offered as a 
necessary condition for enforcement, our credibility principle is not. As argued 
above, we do not believe that deals struck as a result of bluffs should always be 
nullified. See supra  Section I.D .  
54 See Frank Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
33 (1990); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 51, at 270. See also STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 336 (2004). 
55 See supra  Section I.E. 
56 See POSNER, supra  note 52, at 115 (“enforcement of such offers would lower the 
net social product by channeling resources into the making of threats and into 
efforts to protect against them.”) See also Buckley, supra note 54, at 37; SHAVELL, 
supra note 54, at 335. 
57 Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 54, at 335-37 (distinguishing between “induced duress” 
and “naturally occurring duress.”) 
58 See Varouj Aivazian, Michael J. Trebilcock & Michael Penny, The Law of 
Contract Modification: The Uncertain Quest for a Bench Mark of Enforceability, 22 
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 173 (1984). 
59 This is the well-known hold-up problem. See, e.g., OLIVER HART , FIRMS, 
CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, ch. 2 (1995). 
60 Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra  note 8. 
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generally more detrimental than modification in terms of its effect on 
risk allocation and on reliance decisions. Since remedies for breach 
are less valuable to the threatened party than the modified terms (we 
can confidently infer this from the fact that the threatened party opted 
to accept the modified terms rather than seek remedies for breach), 
anti-duress policy that effectively deprives the threatened party from 
the option of accepting a modification and limits her to breach 
remedies has the effect of imposing on her a lower contingent payoff. 
This lower contingent payoff implies an inferior outcome both in 
terms of risk allocation and in terms of reliance investment. 
 Finally, an economic argument has been made that “hard” 
bargaining can lead to inefficient breakdown in negotiations, and that 
setting aside such bargains can enhance efficiency by discouraging 
“hard” bargaining strategies.61 To the extent that this approach 
equates “hard” bargaining strategies with non-credible bluffs, it is 
perfectly consistent with our credibility analysis.62 However, if the 
definition of “hard” bargaining includes the making of credible 
threats, we have shown that setting aside the resulting contract would 
not achieve the desired goal of encouraging successful negotiations. 
“Hard” bargaining would indeed be deterred. The alternative, 
however, would not be “easy” bargaining, but rather no bargaining at 
all.  
 
F. The Prevalence of Credibility Analysis 
 
 The analysis thus far emphasized the features of the credibility 
criterion that set it apart from other criteria for coercion. It now turns 
to the opposite task, of demonstrating that in fact different criteria for 
coercion formulated in the legal and philosophical literature can be 
understood as recognizing, and often implementing the credibility 
criterion. 
 Outside economic theory, philosophers have recognized the 
importance of credibility in determining the existence of coercion. 
Joseph Raz, for example, recognizes that coercion cannot occur unless 
the threatened party perceives the threat to be credible. In other 
words, Raz includes credibility as one of the necessary conditions of a 
coercive proposal. 63 Others simply assume credibility, either 
explicitly or implicitly. 64  
                                                 
61 See Buckley, supra note 54, at 49-50. 
62 See supra Section I.D. 
63 See Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern , in 
Peter French et al., eds., MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, vol. VII, p. 108 (1982) 
(a condition for coercion is that [the threatened party] believes that it is likely that 
[the threatening party] will bring about [the threatened outcome] if [the threatened 
party does not acquiesce].”) 
64 See, e.g., Harry Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, 4 POL. THEORY 
65, 66 (1976) (assuming that everyone involved “has sufficient reason to believe 
that the proposals in question will be carried out if their conditions are fulfilled.”); 
33
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
 CREDIBLE COERCION 31 
Moreover, philosophers have recognized the relationship 
between credibility and the well-being of the threatened party. Robert 
Nozick, for example, makes a fundamental distinction between 
‘threats,’ which are coercive, and ‘warnings,’ which are not.65 When a 
party warns another—makes a credible statement about something 
that he would do if the other party would not perform the requested 
act—he is not acting in a coercive manner. In Nozick’s example, 
when an employer warns the employees that he would shut down the 
factory if they unionize, and when it is true that the employer’s 
preferences would be to shut down (to avoid losing money), the 
employer’s action is not a threat and should not be deemed coercive. 
Indeed, Nozick clarifies that the single factor that makes the statement 
a ‘warning’ rather than a coercive ‘threat’ is its credibility: the fact 
that the employer truly prefers to close down the factory if the 
employees unionize.66 If the employer’s preferences were different—
if he were merely bluffing in saying that he would shut down—his 
action would be deemed a threat, not a warning, and thus coercive.67 
Surely, Nozick did not intend to suggest that anytime an 
intimidating statement is credible it is not coercive. The highwayman 
who tells the innocent traveler that he would shoot him unless the 
traveler hands over all his money could be making a truthful report of 
his “preferences.” If his intentions are truly such that he would prefer 
to shoot the traveler that does not surrender—that is, if it is credible—
should his act be deemed merely a warning, and thus non-coercive? 
What Nozick recognized, in drawing a distinction between threats and 
warnings, is the need to pay attention to the credibility of the 
intimidation. A credible statement should not be treated the same way 
as a non-credible one. In Nozick’s framework, warnings are unlike 
threats because they are informative: they help their recipients take 
superior courses of action. 68 But this is precisely what distinguishes 
credible coercion in our analysis: it represents the feasible course of 
action to avert an even worse outcome.  
Furthermore, in distinguishing between coercive threats and 
non-coercive warnings, Nozick implicitly recognized the difference 
between what we called exogenous versus endogenous credibility. 
Nozick considers an example in which the employer prefers to stay in 
business even if the union wins, but nevertheless threatens his 
employees that he will go out of business, and “[commits] himself 
before hand, for strategic reasons,” to this course of action.69 Here, 
when the employees have to choose whether or not to unionize, the 
                                                                                                                  
WERTHEIMER, supra  note 3, at 203 (“I shall assume that all proposals are credible 
and clear….”)  
65 See Nozick, supra note 3, at 453-58. 
66 Id. at 456. (“In the normal course of events, [the employer] would go out of 
business if the union wins, whether or not he has previously announced that he 
would do so…. In making the announcement, he does not worsen this alternative [of 
the union winning] but rather makes known what its consequences will be.”) 
67 Id. at 455 
68 Id. 
69 Id., at 454-455. 
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threat to go out of business is already credible, given the employer’s 
commitment to it. But it is credible only because it is not sanctioned. 
If society were to view this behavior by the employer as coercive—as 
Nozick suggests—and grant the employees a remedy, it can deter the 
employer from engaging in such prior commitments and from making 
the threat in the first place. Endogenous credibility can be remedied 
by anti-duress measures. 
Charles Fried has also recognized the importance of 
credibility. In discussing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 
(Example 7), Fried emphasizes the need to consider circumstances 
beyond the apparent harshness of the contract. Suppose, Fried argues, 
“that the far greater frequency of default made high prices and harsh 
credit terms a necessity of doing business with an often nearly 
destitute clientele.”70 Under such circumstances, Fried refuses to 
condemn the retailer, who “[is] offering [the] supposed “victims” 
further options, enlarging their opportunities.”71 Thus, Fried 
recognizes that when backed by a credible threat not to deal, 
seemingly harsh contracts in fact enhance the well-being of the 
threatened party. 
In the economically oriented contracts literature the 
importance of a threat’s credibility has been long recognized. 
Specifically, in the context of contract modification, Jason Johnston 
and Alan Schwartz have each argued that the enforceability of a 
modification should be conditioned upon proof of a change of 
circumstances—a change of circumstances that would render the 
threat to breach absent a modification credible.72 Credibility analysis 
has even begun to find its way to court rulings. Some courts have 
adopted the changed circumstances test, although generally without 
recognizing the relationship between this test and the credibility 
criterion. 73 In a few rare cases, however, the credibility test, while not 
                                                 
70 FRIED, supra note 3, at 105. 
71 Id. 
72 See Jason S. Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic 
Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L. J. 335 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and the 
Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 271 (1992). See also  Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and 
Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 421-424 (1977); Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Peirce, 
Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of the Hold-Up Game, 52 L. & 
CONTEMP . PROB. 9 (1989). 
73 See, e.g., Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630 (R.I. 1974) (“The modern trend appears 
to recognized the necessity that courts should enforce agreements modifying 
contracts when unexpected or unanticipated difficulties arise”). Also, the U.C.C., in 
Section 2-209, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, in Section 89, invoke a 
changed circumstances analysis. See U.C.C., Section 2-209, comment 2: “… the 
extortion of a “modification” without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as 
a violation of the duty of good faith…. The test of “good faith” between merchants 
or as against merchants… may in some situations require an objectively 
demonstrable reason for seeking a modification. But such matters as a market shift 
which makes performance come to involve a loss may provide such a reason….”; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 89: “A promise modifying a duty under 
a contract not fully performed on either side is binding (a) if the modification is fair 
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explicitly invoked, in fact underlies the decision. 74 Yet, unfortunately, 
courts by and large fail to apply credibility analysis in contractual 
duress cases.75 
While the credibility criterion has significantly informed 
previous discussions of coercion, it was not—as far as we can tell—
elevated to the role that our analysis demonstrated it merit s. Many, 
including economists, have argued that the credibility of the threat is a 
necessary condition for enforcement of contracts. But they went on to 
argue that additional conditions must also be met, conditions that 
focus on the threatened party’s volition. 76 The analysis in this Article 
differs in that it accords the credibility criterion a more prominent 
role: credibility of the threat is a sufficient condition for the law to 
refrain from intervening via anti-duress relief. 
 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
A. Contractual Duress 
 
The negotiation of a transaction (or of its modification) often 
involves threats by one party to refrain from dealing (or to breach) 
unless a particular provision, strongly favorable to the threatening 
party, is accepted. For centuries, contract law has been searching for a 
unifying principle that will determine when such threats go beyond 
hard legitimate bargaining and should be considered “improper,” 
rendering the resulting agreement unenforceable on the grounds of 
duress. Thus far, such a general criterion has failed to emerge.77 
It is beyond dispute that an "improper threat" can create duress, 
and justify the rescission of the contract, even if it does not involve 
the infliction of physical harm (the "gun-to-the-head" case). The term 
                                                                                                                  
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the 
contract was made….”   
74 For example, during periods of economic slowdown, courts realize that if parties 
would be unable to renegotiate terms agreed upon prior to the recession, they would 
likely breach and suffer bankruptcy, leaving the breached-against party without 
remedy. One recurring scenario in which such analysis was conducted involves 
long-term tenants who, in the face of solvency problems, demand a price reduction 
midway through the lease or else abandon the premises. As one court explained: “A 
lease which provides  for too high a rent may be less valuable to the landlord than 
one providing for a proper rent [. . .] They desired that their tenants should continue 
in business under circumstances which should afford more assurance of success.” 
Jaffray v. Greenbaum, 20 N.W. 775, 778 (Ia. 1884). See also  Ten Eyck v. Sleeper, 
67 N.W. 1026 (Minn 1896). More recently and explicitly, Judge Posner explained 
that if a party cannot commit to a modification, the modification would not be 
offered, with the adverse effect of suffering breach and litigation costs. See The 
Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983). 
75 See infra  Section III.A. 
76 See Schwartz, supra  note 72, at 308-313 (arguing that modifications should be 
enforced when the paying party is cut from the market). 
77 “The history of generalization in this field offers no great encouragement for 
those who seek to summarize results in a single formula.” See Dawson, supra note 
23, at 289. 
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“economic duress” has been used to reference the type of coercion 
inflicted by a strong market participant on a weaker contracting 
partner. Similarly uncontested is the  understanding that economic 
duress does not have to exhibit itself through explicit extortion or 
threats. But the question remains: Where does legitimate hard 
bargaining end and where does illegal duress begin? 
In searching for an answer to this basic question, the defining 
perspective in duress jurisprudence has been, by and large, that of the 
threatened party. If this party is pressured to agree because she has 
"no reasonable alternative," the law permits her to invalidate her 
promise. Under this "no reasonable alternative" criterion, if the 
threatened party were unable to find substitute performance elsewhere 
or if, in the event of a threat to breach, her remedies for breach would 
have been inadequate, her assent is presumed to be coerced.78 
Our analysis suggests that this criterion for duress, centered on 
the threatened party, is misguided. A threatened party lacking 
reasonable alternatives would want the option to secure performance 
through concession. Ironically, duress doctrine, seeking to provide ex-
post protection to a coerced party, deprives this party of the option to 
concede, thereby undoing the only ex-ante protection the party has.  
When the threat—to walk away from a deal or to breach an 
existing contract—is credible, the only realistic choices for the 
threatened party are to acquiesce or to reject the threatening party’s 
demand and suffer the consequences. When the threatened party has 
no reasonable alternatives, she does not want to suffer the 
consequences; she prefers to surrender. The only way she can secure 
the desired performance is by committing to an enforceable 
concession. But, under current duress doctrine she can’t.  Because the 
law deems the surrendered concession coercive and thus voidable, 
precisely when no reasonable alternatives were available, it renders 
such a commitment impossible. Anticipating that the concession 
would be revoked ex-post, a party armed with a credible threat would 
not bother to threaten non-performance; he would simply breach and 
walk away. Thus, when the threat is credible, it is in the interest of the 
threatened party that her concession be enforced. Only when the 
threat is not credible, can the threatened party benefit from ex-post 
nullification without compromising her ex-ante interests. The 
enforceability of contractual concessions should thus be determined 
                                                 
78 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 ("If a party's manifestation of assent is 
induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no 
reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim"). Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 175 cmt b, Ill. 5: "A, who has contracted to sell goods to B, 
makes an improper threat to refuse to deliver the goods to B unless B modifies the 
contract to increase the price. B attempts to buy substitute goods elsewhere but is 
unable to do so. Being in urgent need of the goods, he makes the modification. [...] 
B has no reasonable alternative, A's threat amounts to duress, and the modification 
is voidable by B.” See also  WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §7.37 at 603 (4th ed. 1992) 
(under the Restatement, “the only justification for enforcement of the modified 
undertaking seems to be the apparent voluntariness of the promisor in freely uttering 
his new promise”.) 
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first and foremost by the credibility criterion, not by the “no 
reasonable alternatives” test. 
To illustrate this critique of the existing duress doctrine, as 
well as the central importance of credibility analysis, consider the 
case-book favorite Austin v. Loral.79 In that case, a supplier of 
sophisticated technological parts threatened to withhold delivery 
unless the buyer acquiesced to significant price increases. The buyer, 
who had urgent need for the supplied parts in order to keep up his 
own obligation to a client, acquiesced, secured timely delivery, and 
then asked the court to invalidate the price modification on the 
grounds of duress. The Appeals Court was split on the question of 
whether the buyer had “no reasonable alternatives,” with a slim 
majority holding that, due to the absence of substitute performance 
and the inadequacy of remedies in this case, the buyer was under 
duress and the modification was unenforceable. The dissent found 
that the ‘no reasonable alternatives’ test was not satisfied in this case. 
Both the majority and the dissent agreed, however, on the 
methodology, namely that enforcement should depend strictly on the 
issue of the threatened party’s alternatives.  It must be shown that “the 
threatened party could not obtain the goods from another source and 
that the ordinary remedy of an action for breach of contract would not 
be adequate.”80  
Neither the majority nor the dissent examined, in this case, the 
credibility issue, on which the decision should have, ideally, turned. 
For if the supplier had a credible threat to cease delivery—had Austin 
preferred to breach and pay damages over performance under the 
original price—parties in the buyer’s position would generally be hurt 
by the doctrine that grants them ex-post relief: They would be 
deprived of the option to modify the contract and would likely face 
breach. While it is not clear one-way or another, there are indications 
in the case report that the supplier’s threat to cease delivery was 
credible. The supplier did suffer a cost increase and appeared serious 
in its threat/warning that delivery would be halted.81 Thus, if indeed 
the threat was credible, the buyer—or a party who similarly lacks 
reasonable alternatives—would be worse off under the court’s 
decision not to enforce the modified agreement. 
To determine whether a threat was credible, courts have to 
compare the threatening party’s payoff from carrying out the threat 
and ceasing delivery to his payoff from retracting his threat and 
                                                 
79 Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (NY 1971). This case 
appears in many casebooks, e.g., FULLER AND EISENBERG, supra  note 31, at 122. 
80 272 N.E.2d, at 535. 
81 The supplier claimed, and the majority in the lower court confirmed, that it 
suffered a significant cost increase. See Austin Instrument v. Loral Corp., 316 
N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (1970). Further, it is reported that following its modification 
demand but prior to the buyer’s acquiescence, the supplier indeed ceased delivery. 
See 272 N.E.2d, at 534. It might still be argued that the supplier, a solvent company, 
would have been able to afford a fully compensatory expectation remedy. It is clear, 
however, that the answers to these issues did not appear relevant to the judges in 
deciding whether to enforce the modification. 
38
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 5 [2004]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art5
 CREDIBLE COERCION 36 
dealing under less favorable terms. In Austin v. Loral, for example, 
courts would have to look at the supplier’s cost of performance, 
versus the cost to him from breaching the original contract, namely, 
what portion of the loss (to the buyer) would the supplier effectively 
bear, given doctrinal limitation on recovery, solvency constraints, 
delay in execution of judgments, discounts due to settlements, and the 
like. The greater is his cost to perform, the more credible his threat to 
breach. Conversely, the greater his legal responsibility and practical 
ability to pay damages for breach, the less likely is it that a rational 
supplier would choose to breach in the event that his threat is rejected 
or that a modification cannot be enforced. 
While it is impossible to conclude whether Loral’s threat was 
credible in the circumstances reported in that case, the type of 
credibility analysis that the court never made (and, we believe, may 
have mandated the opposite outcome from the one actually reached) 
can nevertheless be illustrated in a uniquely similar context. As it 
turns out, Loral, the very same party who was the recipient of the 
threat to breach in the Austin v. Loral case, is currently involved in an 
identical dispute, this time as the threatening party. Just as Austin did 
to Loral, Loral is now threatening to withhold delivery of 
sophisticated manufactured goods (this time, a weather observation 
satellite) unless the buyer (this time, the Japanese air traffic control 
agency) agrees to pay $30M more than the original agreed-upon price 
of $136M. It is reported in the press that “Loral has threatened to 
indefinitely hold up delivery of the spacecraft unless the customer 
agrees to concessions.”82 As in the Austin case, the buyer in the 
current dispute is in urgent need for supply, which, if delayed, could 
“impede safety and efficiency upgrades of air traffic management 
over the Pacific Region.”83 While it is not clear yet whether the buyer 
intends to surrender and agree to the price modification (and whether 
the price modification will be challenged once delivery is rendered), 
the two Loral cases have a striking similarity: the supplier threatens to 
delay delivery to a buyer that cannot afford to wait, demanding price 
increases of 20-25%.  
It is quite clear, though, tha t the current Loral episode is a case 
of a credible threat to breach. A few months prior to the threat, Loral 
filed for Bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Reorganization proceedings 
often accord the bankrupt promisor a shield from contractual 
obligation, and indeed the Bankruptcy Court, while recognizing the 
urgency for the buyer, denied the buyer’s request for a restraining 
order that would have forced Loral to abide by the original delivery 
date.84 Given Loral’s financial woes, it would probably be unable to 
pay a meaningful remedy for breach or delay, in case the buyer were 
                                                 
82  Loral Bankruptcy Case Faces New Hurdles: Air Traffic Control, by Andy 
Pasztor, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 10, 2003, p. B1.  
83 Delays in Loral Satellite Raise Fears in Japan About Air Safety, by Andy Pasztor, 
The Asian Wall Street Journal, Oct. 13, 2003, p. M12. 
84 Judge Denies Japanese Agencies’ Request Against Loral, by Ellen Sheng, Dow 
Jones News Service, Oct. 10, 2003. 
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to seek one. Accordingly, the best the buyer can hope for is delivery 
under a new, higher price. If the law of contracts were to make the 
new price void per duress, Loral is highly likely to use the bankruptcy 
shield and drop the contract altogether. 
Generally, in assessing the credibility of the threat to breach, 
the main parameters are the pecuniary consequences to the 
threatening party of either carrying out the threat or retracting it. If it 
is more costly to perform an existing contract than to breach it and 
pay damages, the threat to breach is credible. But credibility may also 
arise from non-pecuniary costs. That is, even if it is more costly to 
breach from a purely economic perspective, a threat to breach may be 
credible when other, non-pecuniary costs are taken into account. To 
illustrate, consider the classic case of Alaska Packers v. Domenico.85 
A group of seamen aboard a fishing vessel went on strike in mid sea, 
threatening to jeopardize the short fishing season. Unable to find 
substitute workers, their employer agreed to increase their wage. At 
the end of the season, the employer refused to pay the modified wage 
and the Court of Appeals allowed him to invalidate the modification, 
on the grounds of coercion, pointing out that the wage increase was 
extracted at a time in which the threatened employer was most 
vulnerable, having no adequate remedies or substitutes. Indeed, many 
commentators in the hundred years since have branded this case as the 
prototype gun-to-the-head case, suggesting that the seamen’s threat 
was opportunistic and non-credible.86 According to this conventional 
view, had the employer rejected their demand, the seamen would have 
been better off returning to work than breaching the contract and 
losing the entire season’s worth of wages.  
But the seamen’s threat to strike may have been credible, even 
if “irrational.” According to one published account of the background 
of this case, the seamen realized that their employer misled them, that 
they were going to earn significantly less than they expected, in a 
harsher work environment.87 It might well be that the seamen were 
willing to forgo the small wage they would earn, in order to avoid 
what they considered an exploitative and unfair compensation. True, 
from a strictly pecuniary point of view, the seamen surely realized 
that they were better off working for the low wage than striking and 
getting no wage at all.  But the pecuniary calculus is surely not the 
only motivating factor. In general, a party whose share in the surplus 
is reduced in a manner that violates his notions of fairness and self 
dignity may have a credible threat to breach, even if his absolute 
                                                 
85 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
86 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 72, at 423-24 (“[I]n Alaska Packers’ the likelihood 
of termination was much less [than in Goebel v. Linn] since the threat to terminate 
was not a response to external conditions genuinely impairing the [fishermen’s] 
ability to honor the contract but merely a strategic ploy designed to exploit a 
monopoly position.”); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 70, 72 (4th ed. 2001)(the seaman’s threat was 
opportunistic).  
87 Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers v. Domenico, 2000 UTAH L. 
REV. 185.  
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pecuniary payoff from performance is still positive and greater than 
his pecuniary payoff from breach. 88 If these fairness concerns are 
sufficiently strong they can render a party’s seemingly non-credible 
threat credible indeed, thus justifying enforcement of the coerced 
deal. The point here is not that these particular fairness concerns are 
necessarily prevalent, but that threats may be motivated—and may be 
rendered credible—by emotional drives as much as by pecuniary 
interests. Concessions extracted by credible threats should be 
enforced, regardless of how “rational” is the motivation that generates 
the credibility.  
 
B. Unconscionability 
 
The doctrine of unconscionability in contract law regulates 
two facets of the bargain. Under what is commonly termed 
‘procedural unconscionability’  the law enables a party who was 
muscled into a bad agreement to void her consent. The type of 
procedures that are unconscionable include ones that give rise to 
claims of coercion and unfair surprise, and—being the “common law 
cousins” of duress89—we will not discuss them any further. The 
second prong of the doctrine of unconscionability is known as 
‘substantive unconscionability’—standards of minimal equity in the 
division of the contractual surplus which, if violated, permit courts to 
replace the oppressive terms with more reasonable ones.90 Substantive 
unconscionability allows courts to tinker with the contract’s 
provisions, such as price or credit terms, in order to make them less 
one-sided, even if the process of bargaining did not involve threats or 
procedural flaws that indicate coercion. 
Legal intervention in substantively unconscionable terms is 
often justified from an ex-post perspective: the weak party would 
surely be better off once she is relieved from a particularly 
unfavorable term.91 But justifications for the doctrine are also stated 
in ex-ante terms: strong parties should be discouraged from including 
such terms in the contract. Under the unconscionability doctrine, so 
the argument goes, the strong party—often described as a 
‘monopolist’—would be unable to fully exploit his bargaining power, 
and would therefore settle for less one-sided terms.92 
                                                 
88  See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 11. 
89 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 214 (4th 
ed. 1995) 
90 Under UCC §2-302, if a term is unconscionable courts may refuse to enforce it or 
the entire contract, but may also limit the application of the unconscionable term, by 
reducing excessive prices.  
91  The standard examples in Contracts Casebooks involve door-to-door sales, in 
which home appliances are sold to uneducated consumers at prices far and above 
market standards. See, e.g., Toker v. Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. 1970). 
92 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 741, 750 (1982) (“in some transactions occurring off competitive markets a 
party might not be deterred from contracting by the prospect of a reduction in 
price.”) 
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While substantive unconscionability cases are ones in which 
explicit coercive threats are absent, the credibility-of-threats 
framework developed in this Article applies nonetheless. The question 
is whether the implicit threat by the strong party, which perhaps was 
never voiced in the actual deal formation, to refrain from dealing 
unless the unconscionable term is included, was credible. Take the 
monopolist example. Surely, the monopolist never bothered to 
“threaten” the consumer; but the take- it-or-leave- it format of 
bargaining is equivalent to a threat: “accept my terms, or no deal.”93 If 
the threat is credible, namely, if the strong party would prefer to forgo 
the entire deal if it had to settle for a smaller (yet positive) profit, ex-
post legal intervention would deprive the weak party of the 
opportunity—bleak as it might be—to transact. Unless paternalistic 
motives are involved, it would be difficult to justify this intervention 
as protective of the weak party. 94 
On the other hand, consider the infamous door-to-door sales 
cases, where consumers routinely pay up to fifteen times the 
maximum retail price.95 While the substantive unconscionability 
analysis in these cases is often accompanied by sharp criticism of the 
deceptive tactics used by the door-to-door salesman, connoting 
procedural unconscionability, at least some courts have been willing 
to strike down contracts based on “price unconscionability” per se.96 
Credibility analysis supports such price-based review. The extreme 
disparity between the price charged in the door-to-door sale and the 
much lower price charged for an identical product in an accessible 
market supports a presumption that the seller would not have walked 
                                                 
93 Interestingly, a similar “accept my terms, or no deal” situation pertains also in a 
perfectly competitive market. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 
262-63 (1974); TREBILCOCK, supra note 50, at 79. 
94 This does not mean, of course, that other policy responses, such as antitrust 
regulation, should not be employed to limit the incidence of monopoly. Moreover, 
the distinction between endogenous and exogenous credibility may underlie the 
differential attitude towards take-it-or-leave-it proposals in monopolistic versus 
competitive markets. Specifically, ex-post intervention may be justified if the 
credibility of the monopolist’s threat is endogenous. It may well be the case that the 
monopolist would not have a credible threat in a one-shot game with a single 
consumer: a lower profit margin on this consumer would be preferable to losing the 
transaction altogether. The credibility of the monopolist’s threat not to deal derives 
from its desire to establish a reputation for not caving in. Otherwise, it will end up 
losing its monopolistic power vis -à-vis all consumers. The credibility of the 
monopolist’s threat is, therefore, endogenous. A legal regime that refuses to enforce 
monopolistic prices defeats the reputation-building strategy. As argued above, in 
endogenous credibility cases ex-post relief may well be justified. See supra  Section 
I.E.   
95 See, e.g., Vacuum Cleaners, 58 CONSUMER REPORTS 67, 72 (“[The price of 
cleaners sold door-to-door] can be 5, 10, even 15 times that of other machines of 
similar cleaning abilities.”) 
96 See, e.g., Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 654 (S. Ct. N.J. 1971) (Since “the 
price unconscionability rendered the sales contract invalid as to all consumers who 
executed it,” class-wide relief was granted, extending to unnamed 
plaintiffs/consumers.) 
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away from the deal, even if forced to accept a significantly lower 
price.97 
Finally, courts have faced similar trade-offs in the rent-to-own 
cases, in which consumers again end up paying high mark-ups for 
conventional appliances. Here, too, courts have faced deals that 
manifest no procedural flaw, only substantively inflated prices. Often 
the legal approach to these contracts focused on the consumer’s 
perspective—how much higher is the contract price relative to the 
market price. Yet, the consumer cannot be protected without 
accounting for the seller’s perspective. Here, the risk that the 
consumer would default, return the item, or inflict repair costs on the 
lessor/seller should be accounted for in determining whether the price 
is excessive, or else consumers might be deprived the accessibility 
that this market niche provides.98 
 
C. Bankruptcy Law and the Necessity of Payment Doctrine  
 
The financial hardship suffered by the threatening party, 
specifically bankruptcy or the prospect of bankruptcy, can increase 
the credibility of his threats by limiting the possible adverse 
consequences from carrying-out the threat. In particular, if bankruptcy 
reduces the threatening party’s exposure to breach remedies, the 
threat to breach may become credible. 
Financial hardship and bankruptcy, however, can affect 
credibility analysis also when encountered by the threatened party. 
Consider the following typical case. A supply contract is signed 
between a retailer and a supplier. After the supplier performs his part 
of the deal, but before the retailer completed payment on the contract 
the retailer files for bankruptcy. At this stage, the retailer’s debt to the 
supplier joins the retailer’s other debts, and under the “equality of 
treatment” principle,99 the supplier can expect to receive only a small 
portion of the contract price (or nothing at all, if the retailer has 
substantial higher-priority debt). 
                                                 
97 See also Eisenberg, supra  note 92, at 781-85 (arguing against the exploitation of 
consumers’ “price-ignorance,” specifically in door-to-door sales.) 
98 See Remco Enterprises Inc. v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567 (1984) (holding that a 
markup of 108% on a TV set is not unreasonable given the credit risk, the absence 
of a down payment, the option to return and the benefit of repair services.) See also 
MACAULAY ET . AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 714-716 (2d ed. 2003) 
(describing litigation over rent-to-own contracts in Wisconsin and reporting that as 
a result of case decisions, the leading supplier in this market ceased its business in 
the state.) 
99 11 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1122.03 (Rev. 15th ed. 1996); Young v. Higbee 
Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945). 
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Now assume that the retailer opts for reorganization, rather 
than liquidation. 100 Also assume that in order to continue running her 
business and to maintain the lifeline of supply the retailer must enter 
into a new contract with the supplier. But the supplier threatens to 
walk-away and withhold the critical supplies unless the retailer pays 
her pre-petition debt in full. If the supplier’s threat is credible, and the 
going concern value of the debtor is greater than the liquidation value, 
then strict adherence to the “equality of treatment” principle will only 
harm the retailer’s other creditors. 
Indeed, already in 1882, the Supreme Court carved out an 
exception to the “equality of treatment” principle—the “necessity of 
payment” doctrine.101 In explaining the “necessity of payment” 
exception, the Court explicitly refers to the benefits from allowing the 
debtor to succumb to the supplier’s demands. However, being 
uncomfortable with what it perceived as rewarding blackmail, the 
Court limited the scope of the “necessity of payment” doctrine to 
cases, such as the 1882 railroad case in which the doctrine originated, 
where the public interest requires the survival of the debtor’s 
business.102  
Despite this “public interest” or railroad limitation, bankruptcy 
courts and district courts have used the “necessity of payment” 
doctrine to authorize payment of pre-petition debts, when they have 
found that a failure to do so would impede the debtor’s efforts to 
reorganize.103 Of course, failure to allow payment of pre-petition 
debts would only obstruct the reorganization objective when the 
supplier’s threat to withhold delivery is credible. The central role of 
credibility analysis has been recognized by at least some courts. For 
example, in the recent CoServ case, the bankruptcy court introduced a 
three-part test of necessity that closely tracks the credibility 
question. 104 Under this test, it must be shown that unless the debtor 
surrenders and pays the debt to the supplier, it risks the loss of 
economic advantage that is disproportionately higher than the 
supplier’s claim, and that there is no other way to deal with the 
                                                 
100 Namely, the retailer chooses to invoke Chapter 11, rather than Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
101 Miltenberger v. Logansport Railway Company, 106 U.S. 286 (1882).  
102 106 U.S. at 312. 
103 See Donald S. Bernstein, Post-Petition Payment of Pre-Petition Debt in 
Corporate Reorganization Cases (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); 
Thomas J. Salerno, “The Mouse that Roared” or “Hell Hath No Fury Like a 
Critical Vendor Scorned,” ABI Journal (June 2003). Section 105 of the Code and 
the broad equitable powers that it bestows upon the courts, are often invoked as 
authority for allowing the payment of pre-petition debts. 
104 See In re CoServ L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 498-99 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002). 
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supplier other than by payment of the claim.105 It is only when the 
threat of the supplier is credible that the CoServ test of no-other-way-
to-deal-with-the-supplier would be fulfilled. Accordingly, the CoServ 
approach is consistent with the credibility criterion.  
While the lower courts have been willing to extend the reach 
of the “necessity of payment doctrine,” the few Circuit courts that 
have considered the issue in the post-Code period have been much 
more restrictive. For example, in 1983, the Ninth Circuit, reluctant to 
compromise the “equality of treatment” principle, refused to authorize 
the payment of pre-petition debt. Thus, following the pre-Code 
Supreme Court precedent, the appellate court limited the “necessity of 
payment” doctrine to railroad cases.106 In that case, however, as the 
lower court recognized, all indications suggested that the suppliers’ 
threats were credible. The bankrupt trucking company, in order to 
stay in business, needed fuel and truck parts. The suppliers—some of 
them discount sellers—refused to continue supply unless pre-petition 
debts were paid and all new business was conducted in cash. 107 
Indeed, the creditors’ fears, which gave rise to their threats to cease 
supply, were not unfounded: the debtor eventually shut down 
operation and liquidated. In all likelihood, but for the payment of the 
pre-petition debt, the creditors would not have given the debtor a 
chance to reorganize. By restricting the scope of the “necessity of 
payment” doctrine and the credibility-of-threat analysis that this 
doctrine implies, the Ninth Circuit constrained the ability of 
financially troubled firms to enter new transactions and avoid 
liquidation. 108 
Recently, the Seventh Circuit issued an important decision 
addressing both the application and scope of the “necessity of 
payment” doctrine.109 The Seventh Circuit found that, in theory, the 
Bankruptcy Code can be interpreted to allow for general application 
of the “necessity of payment” doctrine, beyond the railroad context.110 
Substantively, the Seventh Circuit explicitly recognizing the key role 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 In re B&W Enterprises, 713 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983). 
107 In re B&W Enterprises, Inc., 19 B.R. 421 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982) (Recognizing 
that creditors refused to extend further credit and placed all services and goods 
provided on a "cash only" basis.) 
108 The Sixth Circuit, in a case decided in the same year as B&W, expressed a 
similar view. While not referring explicitly to the “necessity of payment” doctrine, 
the appellate court held (in dicta) that the bankruptcy court could not authorize the 
payment of pre-petition debts. See In re Crowe & Associates, 713 F.2d 211, 216 (6th 
Cir. 1983). 
109 In re Kmart Corp., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3397 (7th Cir., Feb. 24, 2004). 
110 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit invoked 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1): “The trustee [or 
debtor in possession], after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than 
in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate." 
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of credibility analysis: “the debtor must prove… that, but for 
immediate full payment [of the pre-petition debt], vendors would 
cease dealing.”111 Applying this rule of law to the Kmart facts, the 
court found that no evidence was presented to support a claim that 
“any firm would have ceased doing business with Kmart if not paid 
for pre-petition deliveries.”112 
While more receptive to the credibility test, the recent decision 
by the Seventh Circuit makes clear that generally vendors would not 
be expected to have a credible threat not to deal, as long as payment 
for future deliveries is guaranteed: “To abjure new profits because of 
old debts would be to commit the sunk-cost fallacy; well-managed 
businesses are unlikely to do this.”113 In many cases, insisting on the 
payment of pre-petition debts may indeed be “irrational.” The 
appellate court presumes the existence of only rational, profit-
maximizing vendors, and thus concludes that credibility is unlikely. 
But not all vendors are necessarily rational, and we have seen that 
credibility can be based on “irrational” motives.114 Moreover, while 
profit-maximization implies non-credibility in many cases, there are 
other cases, where a rational, profit-maximizing vendor with a cash 
flow problem may credibly insist on the payment of pre-petition 
debts.  
Credibility analysis suggests that the resistance of the Ninth 
and Sixth Circuits to the “necessity of payment” doctrine will often 
result in harm to the very creditors that these courts seek to protect. 
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has exhibited a more 
complete appreciation for the implications of credible coercion. Still, 
the apparent inclination of the Seventh Circuit toward a broad no-
credibility presumption runs the risk of practically eliminating the 
“necessity of payment” doctrine, to the detriment of all creditors. 
 
D.  Plea Bargains  
 
Plea bargains are a unique species of contract that raises 
frequent concerns of coercion. 115 A defendant who is given a choice 
between pleading and facing a jury trial that might result in a more 
severe punishment often chooses to plea, a choice that many view as 
                                                 
111 In re Kmart Corp., 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3397, at *1-2 (7th Cir., Feb. 24, 2004). 
112 Id. at *18-9. 
113 Id. at *17. 
114 See supra Section III.A. 
115  The view that a plea bargain is a species of contract, and that standard defenses 
such as contractual duress can be invoked is not novel. See, e.g., Santobello v. New 
York ; Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909 (1992). 
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coerced.116 In fact, the defendant’s confession through a plea bargain 
has been compared to the medieval European practice of extracting 
confessions through torture.117 The threat to prosecute, similar to the 
threat to torture, “makes it terribly costly for an accused to claim his 
right […]. There is, of course, a difference between having your limbs 
crushed if you refuse to confess, or suffering some extra years of 
imprisonment if you refuse to confess, but the difference is of degree, 
not kind. Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive.”118 
In applying the credib ility methodology to this setting, the 
assessment of a plea bargain ought to begin by asking whether the 
prosecutor’s threat to proceed with the case all the way through a jury 
trial (if the defendant rejects the plea bargain) is credible. If the threat 
is credible, then the plea bargain itself is the only effective way for 
the accused to avoid an even worse alternative—trial. If courts were 
to strike down this plea bargain as coercive, or if society were to 
eliminate the practice of plea bargains altogether, as some 
commentators concerned with the problem of coercion proposed,119 
defendants—having been freed from the coercive torture- like 
process—would not necessarily be better off. Whenever the threat to 
prosecute would have been credible excluding plea bargains would 
result in jury trials, with a potential for sanctions far exceeding the 
plea bargained sanctions, to the detriment of the accused. To those 
defendants that face a significant possibility that the prosecutor will 
pursue the charge, plea bargains represent desirable insurance.120 It is 
only when the threat to prosecute is not credible that a plea bargain 
can potentially harm the accused.  
The image of an innocent accused who nevertheless pleads 
guilty is surely an important element underlying the often hostile view 
towards the plea bargain institution. But even here the source of the 
coercion is not the proposal to plea per se. The problem is that the 
criminal justice system cannot ascertain guilt/innocence perfectly. 
Consider the benchmark case of a perfect adjudication system. In such 
an ideal system, a prosecutor would never be able to extract a guilty 
plea from an innocent defendant. Knowing that she will be exonerated 
at trial, the defendant would not concede to even a nominal sanction 
imposed via plea bargain. 121 An analogy to the contract modification 
                                                 
116  See, e.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 
93, 99 (1976) (current system of plea agreements is coercive because it deprives 
defendants from exercising their constitutional guaranteed right to a jury trial.) 
117  John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978). 
118  Id., at 12-13. 
119 See, generally, Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 
CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? , 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984). 
120  This argument is well recognized in the plea bargaining literature. For its most 
comprehensive treatment, see  Scott & Stuntz, supra note 115, at 1913-17; Frank 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 
(1983). 
121 This claim would require some qualification if the innocent defendant would 
need to incur some private non-refundable costs to establish her innocence, even in 
a perfect system. In such a case, to the extent that prosecutors cannot perfectly 
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case is informative. If a buyer expects to receive perfect 
compensatory damages in case the seller breaches the initial contract, 
the seller would not be able to extract any price- increasing 
modification by threatening a breach of contract. Even if the seller’s 
threat to breach is credible, the buyer would rather suffer breach and 
recover damages. The question of credibility becomes operative only 
when the threatened party expects imperfect legal protection of her 
entitlement—that is, imperfect remedies in the contract modification 
case, or imperfect verification of innocence in the plea bargain case. 
In an imperfect system even an innocent defendant might enter 
into a plea agreement in order to avoid the risk of conviction and a 
higher sanction at trial. When the prosecutor’s threat to proceed to 
trial is credible, the plea bargain option is beneficial to the defendant. 
If the defendant could ascertain the credibility of the prosecutor’s 
threat, only such beneficial plea bargains would be made. 
Unfortunately, it is often difficult for the defendant to ascertain 
whether the prosecutor truly intends to follow through on the charges. 
Perhaps the court can assist the defendant by verifying 
credibility ex post, and enforcing plea bargains if and only if the 
prosecutor’s threat to proceed to trial was credible. This is different 
from what courts are currently asked to do, which is to determine 
whether the plea was entered voluntarily. 122 It is also different from 
many of the “safeguards” that other commentators proposed, which 
also focus on the defendant’s freedom of choice, such as the access to 
capable legal counsel.123 Under the credibility criterion, it is not the 
defendant’s frame of mind that courts would have to scrutinize, but 
the prosecution’s perception about the strength of its case.  
This prescription poses, of course, a practical problem. In 
order to assess the perceived strength of the case and the credibility of 
the prosecutor’s threat to proceed to trial, courts would have to 
adjudicate at least the very same issues that the institution of plea 
bargains intended to spare them, and perhaps more. To identify the 
cases in which the prosecutor has a credible threat—the only cases in 
which the plea bargain should be admitted—courts would have to 
determine whether, in the absence of a plea, the prosecutor would 
have pursued the charges. Since a prosecutor’s subjective intent often 
cannot be verified, courts would have to assume that the prosecutor 
would have proceeded only if conviction were a likely outcome. But 
that would require the court to determine the merits of the 
prosecutor’s case using all evidence available to the prosecution, 
while utilizing the same procedural safeguards that the jury trial 
                                                                                                                  
ascertain innocence prior to a trial and therefore might file charges against innocent 
defendants, an innocent defendant would accept a plea bargain so long as the burden 
of the sanction does not exceed her defense costs.  
122 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d) requires courts to determine that the plea is voluntary and 
“not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement”. 
123 See Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion In the 
Negotiated Plea, 13 L. & SOC. REV. 527, 549 (1979). It should be noted, however, 
that certain procedural safeguards can assist the defendant in forming a more 
accurate assessment of the credibility of the prosecutor’s threat. See infra . 
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would have utilized. This is the only examination that would inform 
the court whether the threat to go to trial was credible and whether the 
plea bargain ought to be enforced. But if this were what courts had to 
do when facing a plea bargain, the institution of plea bargains would 
lose its main advantage, of being a cheap substitute to courtroom 
adjudication. 124  
The intolerable burden that a credibility inquiry would impose 
on the courts is amplified by the observation that defendants and their 
attorneys often do not have the necessary information to assess the 
credibility of the prosecutorial threat to try the case, evidenced by the 
fact that almost all defendants plea.125 Consequently, courts would 
regularly be called to make the credibility assessment.  
In some cases, courts would be able to identify non-credible 
threats. Indeed, courts do recognize the strategic motivations that may 
drive prosecutors. It is possible, the Supreme Court explained, for 
“the aggressive prosecutor to bring the greater charge initially in 
every case, and only thereafter to bargain. The consequences to the 
accused would still be adverse, for then he would bargain against a 
greater charge.”126 To the extent that plea bargains struck under such 
manipulative charges can be singled out and given different treatment, 
defendants’ coercion can be alleviated. The Supreme Court, however, 
believes this singling out task to be unattainable.127 
 Moreover, if courts were charged with determining the 
credibility of the prosecutor’s threat, their job would be further 
complicated by the fact that the prosecutor’s decision whether to go to 
trial or drop the case is motivated, not solely by the absolute merits of 
the case at hand, but also by the relative merits, as compared to other 
concurrent cases. For budgetary and other political concerns, 
prosecutors have to concede the relatively weaker cases to make time 
for stronger ones. The more defendants a prosecutor simultaneously 
charges, the less credible is the threat to try each one of the individual 
cases. The problem is that courts are not accustomed to weighing 
“relative culpability,” if only because factors bearing on this issue 
(evidence on concurrent cases and their comparative strength) is never 
presented and is surely inadmissible. 
 Further complications arise from the fact that the credibility of 
the prosecutor’s threat may be linked to other (concurrent and future) 
                                                 
124 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 115, at 1935. 
125  See, e.g., Albert W. Alchuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 
84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975). 
126 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
127 Id., at footnote. (“prosecutors, without saying so, may sometimes bring charges 
more serious than they think appropriate for the ultimate disposition of a case, in 
order to gain bargaining leverage with a defendant […]; this Court, in its approval 
of the advantages to be gained from plea negotiations, has never openly sanctioned 
such deliberate overcharging or taken such a cynical view of the bargaining process. 
[…] Normally, of course, it is impossible to show that this is what the prosecutor is 
doing, and the courts necessarily have deferred to the prosecutor's exercise of 
discretion in initial charging decisions.”) (emphasis added). See also  Scott & 
Stuntz, supra note 115, at 1961-64. 
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unrelated cases through the prosecutor’s reputation concerns. A 
prosecutor may be credibly vindictive against a specific defendant, if 
pursuing harsh sanctions against this defendant would help the 
prosecutor build a reputation for toughness, which in turn would serve 
him in the course of future plea bargaining and help him secure more 
stringent pleas.128 This “reputation-based” credibility, however, is 
endogenous. If plea bargains were to be selectively enforced, with the 
underlying credibility of the threat scrutinized, such that plea bargains 
based on threats that are not credible on their own merits would not be 
enforced, the reputation-building motivation would vanish. 
Prosecutors often bluff; they misrepresent to the accused the 
factors that bear on the likelihood and severity of conviction, and they 
are not always candid regarding their intentions to proceed to trial. 
Given the level of allowable pretrial discovery and the quality of 
defense counsel, the accused often will not know whether the 
prosecutor is bluffing.129 As we have argued above, it is not necessary 
that threatened parties be able to assess the credibility of the threat, if 
courts can step in ex-post and verify its credibility. If courts were 
perfect verifiers of credibility, prosecutors would be deterred from 
making non-credible threats. The problem, again, is that there is no 
short-cut for assessing credibility. By and large, in order to determine 
whether a threat was credible, courts would have to assess the merits 
of the case. 
 Our analysis does not provide an easy fix. Unlike commercial 
contracts disputes, where the issue of the credibility of threats can be 
assessed without overly burdening the court, the confession contract 
cannot be selectively enforced on this basis. Nevertheless, the analysis 
does help in articulating the pros and cons of any plea bargain regime. 
It suggests that non-enforcement will create winners and losers within 
the class of pleading defendants, distinguished by the credibility of 
the prosecutor’s threats.  
On the prescriptive level, while ex post verification of 
credibility must be ruled out, certain procedural safeguards can reduce 
the incidence of non-credible prosecutorial threats. In Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, the Supreme Court advocated more visible charging 
practices and restrictions on the prosecution’s ability to change the 
charge.130 In some situations, relief against non-credible threats may 
be provided by a procedural requirement that the charges against the 
defendant should be presented at the beginning of the bargaining 
process, and that only such set- in-advance indictments can be 
                                                 
128 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 115, at 1964-65. 
129 David A. Jones, Negotiation, Ratification, and Rescission of the Guilty Plea 
Agreement: A Contractual Analysis and Typology, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 591, 625 
(1979); Brunk, supra note 123, at 550. 
130 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 (“it is healthful to keep 
charging practices visible to the general public, so that political bodies can judge 
whether the policy being followed is a fair one. Visibility is enhanced if the 
prosecutor is required to lay his cards on the table with an indictment of public 
record at the beginning of the bargaining process, rather than making use of 
unrecorded verbal warnings of more serious indictments yet to come”.) 
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pursued. Prosecutors would then be unable to threaten more serious  
indictments—indictments that they would not in fact pursue—in 
pressuring defendants to accept a charge-reducing plea bargain. Even 
this, however, would not be of much help if plea bargaining can be 
moved to an earlier stage, prior to the indictment. 
Also in Hayes, Justice Blakmun suggests that the Due Process 
Clause protects against prosecutorial vindictiveness.131 The threat of 
such Due Process ramifications, even if brought to bear only in 
extreme cases, should have a disciplining effect on prosecutors, and 
can perhaps serve to curtail the use of non-credible threats. Finally, 
since ex post verification of credibility by the court is impractical, 
procedural measures that can facilitate ex ante assessment of 
credibility by the accused or her attorney should be considered. For 
instance, enhanced pretrial discovery requirements, and a higher 
quality of court-appointed defense attorneys would reduce the 
likelihood of effective non-credible threats. Note that such higher 
quality defense would not necessarily be more costly. If defendants 
had the “ammunition” to fend off and turn down non-credible threats, 
the result would be fewer threats ex ante, and fewer trials ex post. 
Plea bargains can also display coercion of a different type, by 
the accused who negotiates a lenient plea in exchange for information 
that the police or the prosecutor cannot otherwise acquire. 
Occasionally, after receiving this information, the prosecutor refuses 
to honor the agreement and uses the very same information revealed 
by the accused to charge him with an aggravated crime.132 Here, too, 
credibility analysis can be invoked in two layers. It might seem, upon 
initial reflection, that if the agreement is unenforceable, the accused 
will have nothing to gain by revealing the information, and thus the 
prosecutor will be denied the only opportunity to bargain for time-
sensitive, potentially life saving, information. That is, if the threat not 
to reveal information is credible, the resulting pleas ought to be 
respected by courts or else the information would not be divulged. 
Upon further reflection, however, it is also likely that the mere 
enforceability of such agreements would encourage perpetrators to 
acquire such “bargaining chips” in the first place. That is, the 
credibility of the perpetrator’s threat to remain silent may be 
endogenous. If the perpetrator knew that such agreements are 
unenforceable, he would be less likely to engage in acts that give rise 
to such bargaining opportunities.133 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131 434 U.S. 357, 367-8 (“Prosecutorial vindictiveness, it seems to me, in the present 
narrow context, is the fact against which the Due Process Clause ought to protect”.) 
132 See, e.g., Whitehurst v. Kavanagh, 636 N.Y.S. 2d 591 (Sup. 1995); Matter of 
Schrotenboer v. Soloff, 549 N.E.2d 458 (N.Y. 1989). 
133 Schrotenboer, 549 N.E.2d, at 501 (recognizing that enforcement of the plea 
agreement would reward the perpetrator for “secreting” the abducted children.) 
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E.  Blackmail 
 
The crime of blackmail covers threats to perform an otherwise 
legal act. In the paradigmatic blackmail case, A threatens to disclose 
information harmful to B—a disclosure that may otherwise be within 
A’s rights—unless B pays A a specified sum of money (Example 
6).134  
From a credibility perspective, the pivotal question is whether, 
absent payment by B, A would make good on his threat and disclose 
the information. Timing is crucial here. After the threat has been 
made, and assuming that the act of disclosing the information is not in 
itself illegal, there is little reason for A not to disclose the 
information; A’s threat is credible. At this stage it may well be in B’s 
best interest to strike a deal with A and prevent the disclosure.135 It 
might also seem that, if the threat is indeed credible, punishing A for 
making the threat would only induce A to reveal the information 
without giving B the chance to offer a bribe. 
The criminalization of blackmail, however, operates at the 
earlier pre-threat stage, in which A acquires the damaging 
information. By sanctioning the threat itself, the law provides a 
counter- force to the potential profits from such a threat, thus seeking 
to discourage the very making of the threat. If a party can be deterred 
from making the threat, her expected revenues from the damaging 
information are diminished, potentially discouraging her from 
spending any resource in acquiring this information in the first place. 
Thus, in situations in which blackmail arises from a deliberate plan by 
the blackmailing party to acquire the damaging information for the 
purpose of extracting bribes, the incentive to make such acquisition 
will be unambiguously weaker in a regime that punishes blackmail. In 
these deliberate-acquisition-of- information situations, blackmail 
credibility is endogenous,136 and thus anti-blackmail measures are 
effective. Indeed, this ex ante perspective has been previously 
invoked in defense of the criminalization of blackmail.137 
                                                 
134 See WAYNE R. LA FAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 20.4 (2003); CHARLES E. TORCIA, 4 
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 658 (15th ed. 2003) See also  James Lindgren, 
Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail , 84 COLUM. L. Rev. 670 (1984). The 
underlying problem involves the criminalization of speech. See, e.g., Kent 
Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U.L. REV. 1081 
(1983). The First Amendment claim is, at least in some cases, countered by the 
constitutional right to privacy. 
135 See Richard Epstein, Blackmail, Inc. 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 558 (1983). See 
also  WERTHEIMER, supra note 3, at 93. 
136 An extreme form of which is Epstein’s Blackmail, Inc., a corporation 
specializing in blackmail. See Epstein, supra  note 135.  
137 See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 3, at 102; Jeffrie Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 63 MONIST  156, 162 (1980) (arguing that the prohibition against blackmail 
is designed to limit incentives for the invasion of privacy); Ronald H. Coase, 
Blackmail (The 1987 McCorkle Lecture), 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 674 (1988) (arguing 
that the prohibition against blackmail can prevent wasteful “expenditure of 
resources in the collection of information, which on payment of blackmail, will be 
suppressed.”)  See also  NOZICK, supra  note 93, at 85 (“[A blackmailer’s] victims 
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The legal strategy of criminalization of the threat differs from 
that employed by the credibility-reducing policies described in 
Section I.F. In the blackmail case, the law will not sanction the 
threatened action itself, only the making of the threat—the demand to 
be bribed. Both legal strategies, however, serve the same underlying 
goal—discouraging the creation of credible threats. 
But what if blackmail credibility is exogenous? Imagine, for 
example, a scenario in which during the course of friendship or 
partnership, one party becomes privy to compromising information 
concerning the other party (e.g., tax evasion, marital infidelity, illicit 
hobby, etc.). Eventually, the relationship disintegrates, replaced by 
sentiments of resentment. Now, the informed party is threatening to 
disclose the embarrassing information, and will indeed gain enough 
vengeful satisfaction from such disclosure that only a substantial sum 
of hush money can induce him to keep quiet. In such cases, 
criminalizing blackmail only hurts the threatened party, who may no 
longer be able to prevent the disclosure of harmful information. If 
blackmailing threats are punished indiscriminately, threatened parties 
would gain from the deterrence of the deliberate type of blackmails 
but would lose from their reduced ability to avoid the blackmail that 
utilizes incidentally acquired information. 
 
F. Duty to Help 
 
A party, A, who is in a desperate need for help enters into a 
contract with another party, B, wherein B provides the needed help, 
but over-charges for it. Should the law enforce such a contract? 
Consider the following example. 
 
Example 8: The Tug Case. A ship becomes disabled in 
mid-sea. A tug comes alongside the ship, and the captain of 
the tug offers to save the ship in exchange for 99 percent of 
the value of the ship’s cargo. The owner of the ship agrees. 
Should he be held to the contract? 138 
 
Prior analysis of circumstances akin to The Tug Case in the 
legal and philosophical literatures focuses on the duty to help and its 
                                                                                                                  
would be as well off if the blackmailer did not exist at all.”) In its basic formulation, 
this defense of the prohibition against blackmail justifies only the criminalization of 
blackmail that is based on deliberate investments to uncover harmful information; 
and it cannot explain the current scope of prohibition, which extends to threats 
based on inadvertently acquired information. See Lindgren, supra  note 134, at 689-
94 (distinguishing between entrepreneurial and opportunistic blackmail). However, 
even with inadvertently acquired information, some investment is required to 
leverage the information into blackmail, and the law may well be justified in 
seeking to discourage such investments. See Coase, id, at 674. 
138 This, or similar examples are discussed in POSNER, supra note 52, at 117; FRIED, 
supra  note 3, at 109-111; TREBILCOCK, supra note 50, at 87-90.  
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implications.139 For example, Fried concedes that a duty to help can 
override the principle of “contract as promise,” arguing that cases 
such as The Tug Case fall under the domain of the duress doctrine.140 
Nozick, considering an example similar to The Tug Case, argues that 
since the normal and expected (i.e. morally required) course of events 
is for the tug to rescue the ship, namely since there is a moral duty to 
help, the tug captain is making a coercive threat not to save, rather 
than a non-coercive offer to save.141 
This approach is probably harmless in The Tug Case, where 
the tug’s threat—to “sail away” unless the owner of the ship promises 
to pay 99 percent of the cargo’s value—appears non-credible. 
Generally, however, reliance on duress or duty to help reasoning, 
rather than on credibility analysis, might be misleading, and 
consequently detrimental to potential rescuees. To the extent that 
salvage contracts might be nullified when the threat not to rescue was 
credible the duress methodology will only hurt the very party it is 
attempting to help.  
Admiralty law exhibits a remarkable sensitivity to implicit 
credibility considerations. While admiralty courts have the power to 
strike down salvage contracts specifying exorbitant prices, this power 
is tempered by a nuanced understanding of the potentially detrimental 
ex ante effects that might result from the exercise of such power.142  
First and foremost, when maritime law strikes down a salvage 
contract, it does not leave the salvor empty-handed. Rather it 
guarantees the salvor a “reasonable fee” equal to the (risk adjusted) 
cost of performing the salvage activity plus a bonus.143 The doctrinal 
guidelines determining the magnitude of this “reasonable fee” 
eliminate the potential credibility of the salvor’s threat to sail away. In 
particular, admiralty courts, in measuring the salvor’s cost of 
performance, do not look only to the actual cost of salvage. They also 
consider the salvor’s alternative costs—the value of the salvor’s time 
and profits that could have been made elsewhere.144 This accurately 
                                                 
139 FRIED, supra note 3, at 109-111; CHARLES FRIED, WRIGHT AND WRONG ch. 7; 
Eric Mack, Bad Samaritanism and the Causation of Harm, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 
230 (1980) (reviewing the literature, and criticizing the argument that the Bad 
Samaritan’s omission is the cause of harm); Francis Bolen, The Moral Duty to Aid 
Others as the Basis of Tort Liability, 47 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908) (arguing for a 
duty to rescue); A. M. Honoré, Law, Morals, and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN 
AND THE LAW 238-242 (Ratcliffe ed. 1966) (same). 
140 FRIED, supra  note 3, at 109-111 (“those promises were exacted under duress”). 
141 Nozick, supra note 3, at 449-50. 
142 See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 579 (2nd ed., 
1975); The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186 (1898) (citing cases and summarizing the 
admiralty rule). 
143 See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 142, at 579. See also FRIED, supra note 3, at 
109-111; Post v. Jones , 60 U.S. 150 (1856) (Under circumstances similar to those 
presented in The Tug Case, the Supreme Court refused to enforce the contract, 
limiting the rescuers to the normally allowed fee for salvage, which the Court terms 
“liberal recompense”.) 
144 See infra  discussion of Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150 (1856) (consideration of 
alternative profits); The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186 (1898) (citing “time and labor 
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broad interpretation of “the cost of performance” strips away the 
credibility of the salvor’s threat, and ensures that performing the 
salvage operations is incentive compatible for the salvor. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Post v. Jones,145 is 
illustrative. The facts in Post resemble those in Example 8, only that 
rather than being sold to the captain of a tug, the cargo of the wrecked 
whaling ship, Richmond, was purchased by another whaling ship. To 
be sure the Court, in nullifying the contract between the master of the 
Richmond and its salvors, applies duress reasoning, 146 considers the 
substantive fairness of the contract,147 and invokes the salvors’ duty to 
help.148 But between duress, fairness, and the duty to help, the Court 
also considers the credibility of the salvors’ threat to “sail away.” In 
particular, the salvors claimed that but for the profitable terms they 
secured in return for their effort they would have preferred to continue 
with whale hunting. The Court rejects this claim, finding that given 
the uncertainty and risk involved in catching whales toward the end of 
the season, the salvors would have taken the Richmond’s cargo also 
for the ordinary salvage fee.149 The Supreme Court’s credibility 
analysis ensured that the invalidation of the contract, and the 
replacement of the contract price with a lower, court-determined fee, 
would not discourage salvage in similar situations. 
In fact, the concern with providing ample incentives to rescue 
distressed vessels is a central theme in the admiralty cases. As one 
court held: “The primary principle upon which salvage awards are 
allowed at all is the principle of encouraging rescue.”150 This ex ante 
perspective sits well with the credibility approach advocated in this 
Article. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
expended” a well as “loss of profitable trade” as factors determining the value of the 
salvage service.”)  
145 60 U.S. 150 (1856). 
146 The Court notes that “the master of the Richmond was hopeless, helpless, and 
passive – where there was no market, no money, no competition – where one party 
had absolute power, and the other no choice but submission…” Post v. Jones, 60 
U.S. 150, 159 (1856). 
147 The Court characterizes the contract as “an unreasonable bargain.” Id. at 160. 
148 “[Courts of admiralty will not] permit the performance of a public duty to be 
turned into a traffic of profit.” Id.  
149 Id. 
150 The Donbass, 74 F. Supp. 15, 23 (W. D. Wa. 1947), based on the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1869) (“Compensation as salvage is 
not viewed by the admiralty courts merely as pay, on the principle of a quantum 
meruit, or as a remuneration PRO OPERE ET LABORE, but as a reward given for 
perilous services, voluntarily rendered, and as an inducement to seamen and others 
to embark in such undertakings to save life and property.”) See also  Eisenberg, 
supra note 92, at 761 (recovery “should not only compensate the promisee for all 
costs, but should also include a generous bonus to provide a clear incentive for 
action.”) 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Drawing the line between legitimate proposals and coercive 
threats is a challenge that underlies legal policy in various areas of 
social interaction. Despite continuous efforts, legal doctrine has not 
succeeded in producing a coherent jurisprudence of coercion, and 
legal scholarship has had little success influencing the course of the 
law. On the scholarship front, much of the focus of previous 
theoretical inquiry was on the entitlement of the coerced party, 
characterizing the choices that a free individual should not have to 
face. At the same time, much of the focus of legal doctrine was on 
process violations, characterizing the form of coercive behavior.  
To complement these two traditions , the rights-based 
theoretical inquiry and the process-oriented legal doctrine, this Article 
provides a much-needed incentive approach. The main innovation in 
the Article is in articulating a fundamental criterion for distinguishing 
threats to which the threatened party is better off surrendering. These 
are threats that may unfortunately violate, at times, the coercion test 
underlying the rights-based approach as well as the process 
restrictions of existing legal doctrine. We called the incidence and 
outcome of such threats “credible coercion,” and we argued that acts 
or promises induced by credible coercion should be enforced, 
however discomforting. 
This Article is written in the intellectual tradition of the 
economic approach to law. Even so, the normative premise 
underlying the analysis is different than the one ordinarily motivating 
law and economics scholarship, that of overall efficiency. Here, 
instead, the well being of the threatened party was regarded as the 
sole yardstick by which outcomes ought to be evaluated. 
Nevertheless, the well being of the threatening party, although 
normatively irrelevant under this framework, did play an important 
role. Taking into account the interests of the threatening party 
provided a better understanding of feasibility constraints facing a 
policy maker who is keen on protecting the coerced party. This 
understanding led us to suggest that coerced acts and promises should 
be enforced in a greater set of circumstances than prescribed by other 
normative approaches. 
The emphasis on a morally neutral feasibility analysis may 
seem objectionable to a reader who, like us, views coercion first and 
foremost as a normative problem. That reader might wonder why 
should this criterion, that has the potential to validate morally 
reprehensible coercion, be endorsed? The answer we provided in the 
Article is that there is no other choice. The reader may choose to 
ignore the implications of the morally neutral credibility perspective, 
but unfortunately this will not make them go away. When coercion 
arises from credible threats, advocating a normatively appealing yet 
non-feasible solution is pointless. 
Other readers may find the credibility criterion daunting, as 
we provided only spare guidelines on how to implement it. Do courts 
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have the capacity and sophistication to carry out case-by-case 
adjudication of credibility? The analysis in the Article recognized 
areas in which this adjudicative task is probably too burdensome (e.g., 
plea bargains). But it also identified major areas in which the 
credibility test is implementable and yet regularly overlooked (e.g., 
contract modifications). Overall, the host of factors that can make a 
threat credible and that should enter the credibility analysis is so 
broad as to ignite, again, the temptation to ignore this test and to opt 
for more practical- implementable approaches.  
Unfortunately, the enduring, largely unsuccessful efforts, both 
by judges and by scholars, to come-up with a practical coercion test 
suggest that implementation problems are not unique to the credibility 
test. But even if another test carried the promise of easier 
implementation, the temptation to ignore the credibility test would 
still be self-defeating. It is possible to base a duress regime on other 
criteria, perhaps more readily adjudicable criteria. But that would be 
equivalent to searching for a needle in the wrong haystack, only 
because that haystack is better lit. The “needle” (here, the well-being 
of the coerced party) may be hidden in a dimly lit haystack (the 
credibility test), but that is still the only sensible place to search. 
The credibility perspective, however, is not only inevitable, it 
also carries the promise of effective anti-coercion policy. It teaches 
that non-credible coercion can be cured. It also opens a perspective 
into a rich and textured study, some of it mapped in the Article, of 
how credibility can be affected by legal policy.  
We began with a skeptical view regarding the ability of a 
Liberal society to combat coercion. Indeed, we have shown that many 
common anti-duress measures are, in fact, powerless in aiding 
coerced parties. Moreover, we demonstrated that these measures will 
often harm coerced parties. But what started as a skeptical, critical 
evaluation ended-up providing constructive guidelines for the design 
of effective anti-coercion policies. Credible coercion tells us not only 
what will not work, but also what will. 
 
 
57
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
